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REGIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMIES IN CONFLICT: 
SOUTH AFRICAN HEGEMONY vs SADCC LIBERATION
By Reginald Herbold Green^ and Carol Thompson
It is not only the whites who stand alone at the southern point 
of Africa, every black leader who desires order, freedom, peace 
and development for his people also stands alone.
- Pik Botha, Foreign Minister 
of South Africa, June 1979
South Africa’s resources, experience, acclimatised technology 
and geographic proximity to the other states of Southern Africa 
lends irresistable momentum to the idea (of closer RSA - 
independent state association).
- N. P. Van Heerden, Foreign 
Ministry of South Africa, 
September, 1979
We are gathered here today to try to chart a new course for the 
future of Southern Africa. ...We can wage a successful struggle 
for economic liberation provided we can begin now, in the free 
states of Southern Africa, to plan together for our economic 
future.
- President Seretse Khama
of Botswana, opening Arusha 
SADCC planning conference, 
July, 1979
The present study is... to consider the kinds of leverage that 
regional economic interaction offers South Africa... to examine 
ways in which the Republic could use its economic relationships 
in Southern Africa for non-economic purposes... It would be 
naive in the extreme to argue against South Africa’s use of 
such techniques under all circumstances.
- Deon Geldenhuys, 1981
We are aware that the fundamental aim of the actions of 
destabilisation against our countries is to render SADCC 
non-viable... ports and railways, fuel depots and pipelines, 
bridges and roads, communications systems and other development 
projects are the targets...
- President Samora Machel 
of Mozambique at 1983 
SADCC Summit
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Introduction
The most dramatic forms of conflict in the Republic of South Africa and 
between it and the independent states of Southern Africa and Occupied Namibia 
are military. However, major - perhaps the major - underlying contradictions,
pboth in South Africa itself and between it and the Southern African region,
are economic. These contradictions are both basic and inherently (often
violently) antagonistic as President Machel of Mozambique stressed in his
oaddress on the signing of the abortive Nkomati Agreement with South Africa. 
They arose out of the European conquest of South and Southern Africa and 
centre today on the struggle by South Africa to sustain and expand white 
economic hegemony at home and regionally against the struggle of the 
independent states of Southern Africa and of Namibians and black South 
Africans to overcome it.
Clearly not all South African goals or tactics are, at least in any narrow
sense, political economic. Indeed some have significant economic costs to
South Africa. The Gaborone raid and the political blockage of Customs Union
renegotiation are arguably against RSA's economic interests. Equally not all
non-economic tactics are pursued for security or power reasons. Sabotage is -
especially in respect to transport - an integral South African regional
4economic policy tool. Nor are all tools used to preserve hegemony violent - 
the Customs Union, export credits and ’fighting rates’ on rail traffic are in 
any normal sense non-violent, but they are all instruments used to maintain an 
exploitative regional economic hegomony which by its nature almost inevitably 
leads to violence.
The separation of South African political economic goals, strategies and 
tactics from those more narrowly related to security and power is, therefore,
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somewhat artificial even at analytical level. As the country chapters 
demonstrate, South African regional policy is based on a total strategy aimed 
at what is perceived by the South African regime as a total threat to its 
basic interests (and ultimately survival) both regionally and at home. 
However, it is useful to look more specifically at political economic aims and 
instruments both to understand a central element in the regional struggle and 
to underline that conflict in Southern Africa is not merely a tale of random, 
episodic violence and that ultimately the present forms of political economic 
relations between South Africa and the independent Southern African states 
both constitute economic violence and are ultimately sustained and sustainable 
only by the threat and reality of quite overt economic and military violence. 
To suppose that South African - Southern African economic relations are, or 
with the present South African system can be, basically complementary and 
mutually beneficial, is either ingenuous or disingenous. At best the 
’partnership' South Africa seeks is that which Lord Malverne described as 
existing in the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, a white rider on a 
black horse.
South African Political Economic Objectives
South Africa’s basic political economic objectives are: economic, political 
and security hegemony. The three interlock - even if they may conflict in any 
one particular case - and are mutually reinforcing.
Economic hegemony is important because it pays. South Africa's economic 
growth in the 1970s was relatively modest, under annually. The most 
dynamic element was exports to independent Southern African states - arguably 
accounting for a quarter of total growth.  ^ Further, the South African economy
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is both domestic market and foreign exchange constrained. The relatively
small home market is even more constrained for many products than its absolute
size would suggest because of apartheid’s impact on black incomes and,
therefore, purchasing power. Therefore export expansion is critical to
7sustained growth and surplus generation, particularly in manufacturing.
Furthermore, while South Africa has a relatively internally integrated economy 
(remarkably so for a country of its economic size and level of development), 
it is crucially dependent on imports of fuel, certain capital goods and a 
number of intermediate inputs demand for which tends to grow more rapidly than
Q
overall output. Therefore it needs to secure rapid export growth to avoid 
crippling import capacity constraints. Despite its diversified raw materials 
and gold traditional export base, South Africa can sustain the needed rate of 
export growth (and use it to facilitate structural transformation at home) 
only if it can build a dynamic manufactured export sector growth trend. The 
most logical (in terms of lack of domestic alternatives and of physical and
institutional closeness to the Republic) markets for many products are in the
independent states of Southern Africa.
Sustaining regional economic hegemony is perceived by South Africa - as it was
by its Afrikaaner Republic and British colony predecessors - as far too
important to leave to market forces, let alone free market forces. As SADCC’s
9founding Lusaka Declaration underlines economic hegemony in Southern Africa
has been the result of systematic, selective state and enterprise policies in
transport, in fiscal policy, in enterprise structuring, in investment, in
provision of personnel and knowledge. Present South African state and
enterprise regional policy is in large measure directed to consolidating,
10protecting and expanding that pattern of hegemony and dependency.
Security hegemony interacts with economic. It does so in both directions, not
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as a one way relationship. Economic hegemony reinforces South African 
security because it renders attempts at effective liberation in any sphere 
difficult. This is especially true in respect to transport where denial of 
access to South African routes could at present throttle the economies and the 
functioning of state apparatuses in Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe,
Malawi and - probably - Zambia. However, it is also the case in respect to 
revenue for Customs Union Members and to import sources and export markets 
(including that for labour). All of these dependencies could be reduced, but 
their multiple existence allows South Africa to impose high initial costs in 
sectors of its choice - not necessarily the one in which disengagement is
attempted. It is no accident and no frivolity when RSA brandishes the threat
of economic sanctions against its neighbours to attempt to defuse the growing
international trend toward sanctions against itself - these weak economies 
would be made much weaker by forced, instant delinking from South Africa.
Equally, however, violence by RSA 'security* forces and their proxies is in
some respects critical to maintenance of economic hegemony. Dominance in the
key transport sector is neither geographically nor economically natural.
Ultimately it can be ensured only by action to keep intra-Southern African
11lines wholly or partially non-functional.
12It is neither accidental nor technocratic that both SADCC (for liberation)
13and South Africa (for continued domination) have perceived transport as 
vital. Neither is it accidental nor the result of purely military tactics 
that South Africa has used sustained violence - as well as more directly 
economic means - to ensure that the transport links to Lobito Bay, Maputo, 
Beira and Nacala have been closed, only intermittently available or limited in 
capacity. The war on the Beira-Zimbabwe transport links (a war involving at 
least 25,000 troops on the Zimbabwe/Mozambique and MNR/South African
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'security* services sides) is a war about economics as well as politics.
Political dominance - at least in the sense of being able to ensure that 
independent states do not seriously pursue economic liberation, mobilise 
international pressures on RSA nor provide effective external support to the 
South African internal liberation struggle is also linked to economic hegemony 
in a two way relationship.
Because economic disengagement is costly in the short run - even if often 
demonstrably cost efficient and development generating in the medium and long 
run - it can only be carried out by a government with a clear political
programme. It is South Africa's strategy - using whatever means come to hand 
from economic incentives through sabotage deterrents - to ensure that such 
programmes are neither adopted nor pursued on a sustained basis and that 
significant Southern African domestic interests and sub-classes are convinced 
that disengagement (economic or political) from South Africa is not in their 
interests so that political programmes of economic disengagement will lack a 
firm national base and may even cease to be canvassed seriously.
Thus economic hegemony is a tool for influencing political programmes in 
relation to economic disengagement and more broadly because economic
pressures, as well as terror raids, can be applied against action to support 
the South African liberation struggle or mobilise external pressures on South
Africa. Lesotho's January 1986 experience is a classic case in point.
Conversely acceptance of South African consent or mild disapproval as a 
binding constraint on political programmes would guarantee that they did not 
in any serious way threaten South Africa's regional economic interests. The
illseminal consultancy study by Deon Geldenhuys outlining the uses and tactics 
of economic destabilisation related primarily to limiting independent states
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political projects not to economic interest defence as such.
This presumably underlies South Africa’s vehement - and often violent -
15antipathy to SADCC and passive attitude toward the Preferential Trade area. 
SADCC is overtly political economic and has an explicit political project of 
economic disengagement for which it mobilises external and domestic resources. 
The PTA is much more technically economic, more market and less state 
interventionist and - perhaps as a result - far less oriented to any political 
projects of economic liberation either national or collective.
Of Strategy And Tactics
Because South Africa’s regional objectives are basic and basically 
interlinked, it needs a strategic approach to achieving them, not an episodic 
tackling of one case at a time without regard to the broader picture. South 
Africa has perceived this requirement. Even if the ’’total strategy" and 
’’constellation" formulations1  ^ include a good deal of rhetorical overkill for 
domestic mobilisation and reassurance purposes and in their fullest 
presentations seek the impossible (a Greater Southern African Co-Prosperity, 
Security and Political Support Sphere centred on the South African sun with at 
least the passive consent of the independent and bantustan planets), they do 
constitute operational and to a substantial degree arguably attainable 
strategies. They have formed a framemwork for particular actions and for 
gauging their relative sucess or limitations. This fact can be missed because 
there are at least five - not totally consistent in the abstract and sometimes 
not fully coherently applied contextually - strategic elements.
The first is the provision of incentives to cooperate, or at any rate short
term economic benefits likely to (and intended to) be perceived as such. 
South Africa - especially but not only its business community - has a tendency 
to prefer this approach when it does not perceive its interests to be under 
severe and immediate threat. In the first place the disruptions of using 
sticks are - at least in the short run - bad for exports and profits. In the 
second the use of carrots and of what appear to be mutually advantageous 
agreements, when successful, gives a degree of consent and stability unlikely 
to be achieved either by naked economic force or physical violence.
The range of incentives is wide. The Customs Union Arrangements (an apparent
4l/£ uplift on average regional tax revenue share covering imports from RSA as
well as from outside the Union in return for free market acccess for RSA 
17products) are a major example as are the various arrangements providing
18locomotives, wagons (over 3000 in the case of Zambia and 6000 in total),
technical assistance to Southern African state railways and preferential rail
rates to Southern African exporters and importers using SATS railways and 
19ports. Export credit is another carrot - and an increasingly effective one 
in the current foreign exchange crises of most Southern African states. Even 
if prices are marked up 20 to 30% to cover the credit cost, 18 months to pay 
is a major incentive to an importer or Cental Bank with almost no foreign 
exchange to hand and little or no access to normal commercial credit. 
Specific (and often transitory) incentives are also numerous - e.g. the quotas 
given for Swazi made television sets and fertiliser in the South African 
market (since effectively withdrawn).
It should not be assumed that the incentive element in strategy is benign. In 
the first place benefits to one South African state may be highly damaging to 
the economic interests of others (and increase the difficulty of operating a 
regional project of political economic liberation). The Customs Union
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protects the South African exports to Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland from 
competition from other SADCC states (except for Zimbabwe and Malawi). The
South African credit facilities greatly hamper Zimbabwe exports to Zambia even 
when they are substantially lower cost. The contract rates on external
traffic are carefully tailored to undercut those of the Mozambican rail and
onport system.
Further, the appearance of generosity is often either totally unreal or at the
least conceals a radically unequal division of gains. Because the Customs
Union payments are effectively made two years in arrear, inflation and import
growth fully cancel out the apparent 41% revenue bonus. In most years
Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho would derive more revenue from an independent
21tariff and excise system than from SACUA. However, the barriers to greater 
domestic production, increased regional (intra-SADCC or PTA) trade and
sourcing imports from low cost sources outside Africa are very real. Even in 
the short run they entail higher import bills and in the medium and long they 
are significant obstacles to structural change and development. Provision of
rolling stock and technical assistance to railways also serves South African
22interests. It creates an incentive to, and a body of lobbyists for, using 
RSA routes and improves the efficiency of the Southern African railways using 
SATS - a necessary condition for avoiding chaos on SATS itself in respect to
its transit traffic. As SATS has a surplus of obsolete equipment, the rental
fees almost certainly exceed any alternative earnings on the loaned equipment.
Economic Threats And Penalties
However, the positive strategic element has always been implicitly - and
usually explicitly - combined with negative elements. The threat or reality
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of withdrawal of carrots is in itself a powerful stick - as, e.g. when SATS 
withdrew loaned locomotives from Zimbabwe in 1980-81. As with incentives, 
deterrants are varied. Reducing migrant labour hiring or the terms of 
transfers of earnings to supplier states is a weapon which has been used in 
respect to Mozambique and, less systematically, Lesotho. So has been 
selective interruption of flows of key goods - espcially petroleum products, 
fertilisers and grain - to SADCC states assertedly for technical reasons but 
in fact linked to political and security demands. All of the independent 
states of Southern Africa except Angola and Tanzania (which do not import or 
export via South Africa) have been beaten with this stick one or more times 
over 1980-85. "Technical problems" in relation to moving exports - e.g.
OilZimbabwe steel, Botswana beef - are the complement to similar import delays.
The most dramatic deterrents (or preventatives) are specific acts of economic 
sabotage and the promotion of general insurgency. These have formed the core 
of the strategy with respect to Angola and have become an increasingly 
dominant element in respect to Mozambique. To date elsewhere in the region 
their use has been much more occasional and selective.
Parallel to incentives and deterrents as strategic elements are outward and 
inward looking strategic orientations. The most dramatic variant of the 
outward looking strategy is the vorward or strike kommando policy typified by 
the Maseru, Maputo and Gaborone raids at the single strike level and the 
repeated invasions of Angola at that of maintaining sustained forward struggle 
beyond South Africa’s frontiers.
This strategic element makes relatively little use of economic leverage as 
such. However, it does use both economic sabotage (e.g. pumping plant at 
Maseru; dams, railroads, mines, oil installations in Angola; transport routes
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and oil installations in Mozambique) and more general economic destabilisation 
via South African and proxy armed forces (and the cost of resisting them) in 
both Mozambique and Angola. Thus the economic cost of this policy to target 
states and their people is very high - most dramatically seen in the famine 
which has killed scores of thousands in Southern Mozambique where war has 
prevented normal rural production even when rains were adequate and - in
conjunction with a spurious ’neutrality' by some aid bodies - prevented 
emergency distribution of food and medical supplies.
The aims of this strategic element are not necessarily primariy directly
economic in terms of gains sought by South Africa. Indeed in narrow economic 
terms it is costly - e.g. extra military expenditure probably exceeding $2 
billion a year, higher freight costs from non-use of Maputo, power brownouts
resulting from loss of Cahora Basa supply. Only if one supposes South
Africa’s aim in Angola is to install a regime there which would re-open trade 
and provide a dependable petroleum supply source do any of the vorward policy 
strategies appear to have targets including specific economic benefits to 
South Africa. However, the outward looking strategic orientation is designed 
to protect the political economy of apartheid by keeping opponents far from 
the frontiers and by reducing the economies and polities of unfriendly
neighbours to rubble. In that sense it is macro or mega economic.
The alternative (or alternating) outward strategic element is that of accepted
South African regional hegemony - as most full articulated in P. W. Botha’s
Pfi1979 Carleton House presentation of the "Constellation Plan". In maximalist 
form this strategy seeks a ’co-prosperity sphere' with common economic 
policies, co-ordinated security against common enemies and at least tacit
acceptance of South African political leadership from Zaire through Mozambique 
and from The Cape to the Ruvuma and Congo Rivers. In less ambitious variants
- 12 -
the political element vanishes (or is reduced to avoiding efforts to mobilise 
opposition to RSA) and the security is cut back to refusing bases or presence 
to South African liberation movements and to external armed forces. The 
economic elements - trade, transport, technical and financial assistance - are 
then dominant and the number of regional countries flexible with Lesotho, 
Botswana, Swaziland, a 'Multiparty' Namibia, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe 
the core.
This approach is the regional project most attractive to the private sector - 
and from the point of view of production, export and profit expansion. As 
noted under carrots, it is not by any means benign and does not confer equal 
gains. By strengthening economic links it increases the leverage against 
initiating a political economy of liberation - e.g. the 1980—81 RSA threats to 
end the South Africa/Zimbabwe trade agreement. Further, while primarily based 
on incentives and benefits, this strategic approach can and does make use of 
threats or penalites as reminders and as means to secure specific economic or 
other policy changes by Southern African states.
South African strategy also includes an inward looking or 'into laager' 
element, albeit regionally this has been clearer in the security and political 
than in the directly economic sphere. This element seeks to concentrate South 
African strength in the Republic behind strong defensive walls and with 
minimum dependence on external sources of supply.
Regionally there are few critical imports by South Africa from Southern Africa 
- with the short run exception of gold mine labour. The reduction of use of 
the port of Maputo and of Cahora Basa power, the rundown of migrant labour use 
(albeit neither very pronounced nor consistent to date) and the freezing out 
of certain Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe goods exports could be viewed as
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inward looking. On the regional export side an inward looking strategy of
deliberate retargeting away from the region does not appear to exist - indeed
27SAFTO's thrust is in quite the opposite direction.
However, a strategy which was highly inward looking in respect to 'security', 
political stance and South African imports could also seek to preserve export 
markets (including those for transport services). While not logically 
inconsistent, such an approach would (has where practised as de facto in 
relation to Zimbabwe over most of 1980-85) open up room for manoeuvre by the 
independent state in terms of reducing immediate costs of, and threats to, a 
political economy of liberation project, whether national or coordinated 
through SADCC.
Tactical Instruments For Strategic Ends
As the presentation of strategic elements indicates, tactical instruments
within strategic elements are numerous and varied. Some are quite specific - 
e.g. the proposed (abortive) Swaziland deal to return Swaziland irridenta (one 
bantustan and part of another) to Mbabane - in return for Swaziland accepting 
as Swazi nationals all Swati in RSA (thereby effectively decitizenising the 
urban and mine workers among them), providing a security cordon sanitaire and 
cooperating in RSA rail projects to improve intra-RSA links as well as to
bypass Maputo plus potentially (via the proposed restoration of the Kingdom's 
access to the sea) providing a possible sanctions evading port which would not 
be in RSA territory but would channel goods to it. Others - e.g. the Customs 
Union Arrangements - apply to particular groups of countries, in this case 
Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. A final group, e.g. export credits, rail
rebates are generally applicable to Southern African countries other than
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Tanzania and Angola.
Tactics vary in channels of operation and therefore degree of coordination and 
control. For example, the Customs Union Arrangements are government to 
government, regularly reviewable and physically instantly terminable. 
Existing RSA investment in independent Southern African countries is 
historically determined, not speedily (if at all) removeable and owned by 
private enterprises whose micro interests may be inconsistent with RSA overall 
strategic concerns (e.g. Anglo American’s stake in Angolan diamond mines which 
are a UNITA target for general economic dislocation purposes as well as for 
publicity from kidnapping Anglo's expatriate workers).
However, because the continued operation of many of the South African
investments is critical to the host economies (e.g. the diamond mines in
Botswana), their continued operation could be put at peril by RSA. Thus,
existing investment is to some extent a lever the South African regime can
use. New investment is an intermediate case - the government can directly via
pressure on companies or indirectly via creating economic chaos in the
potential host ensure that such investment does not take place. But it has no
equal power to ensure that it will happen unless it is by a South African
state corporation. Private firms will not rush in unless they see a realistic
prospect of stable profits (including a continuation of the South African
economic tactics which led it to favour the investment). Thus when RSA
favoured (or appeared to favour) investment in Mozambique after Nkomati there
was a flurry of visits but very little actual investment both because the
general economic situation was unpromising and because - advisedly
28businesses were sceptical of how long the detente might last.
There is no 1 to 1 correlation between strategic elements and tactics. Indeed
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sorae are highly ambiguous. For example, special fighting rail and port rate
contracts to Zambia, Zimbabwe and (including road in this case) Malawi could
be seen as ’co-prosperity sphere1 or Constellation building outward strategy
elements if viewed solely in relation to the recipient countries. However,
their primary motivation appears to be to deter utilisation of the Mozambican
(and in the cases of Zambia and Malawi the Tanzanian) port access routes. The
aims of that approach are both to weaken the economies of Mozambique and - to
a much leeser degree - Tanzania and to create obstacles to the political
2Qeconomy of transport liberation project. 7 That could be a defensive element 
in a 'co-prosperity sphere' outward looking strategy but could equally be a 
component in a destabilisation focused vorward strategy.
Seamless Web, Wandering Minstrel or Mass of Contradictions
The question arises as to whether South Africa's strategy and tactics of 
regional hegemony form a seamless web of diabolically clever Machiavellian (or 
Kissingeresque) cunning, a wandering minstrel show lurching from one piece of 
crisis management to another or a mass of internal contradictions and 
insoluble conflicts among South African objectives. The answer is probably 
both none of the above and some of each.
South Africa does have regional interests which it - and its predecessors - 
have defined in fairly stable terms since the early 19th Century. South 
Africa's 1970-1985 regional strategy is both intensely ideological (the 
preservation of apartheid at home and the acquisition of lebensraum, 
especially economic and 'security', for it throughout the region) and 
remarkably consistent in objectives.
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However, the balance among strategic elements and especially among tactical 
instruments has never been uniform among countries and has shifted sharply 
over time with temporary, selective reversals of course overlying a secular 
trend toward rising levels of violence. At this level the political economy of 
regional hegemony has been operated pragmatically, responding to perceptions 
of attainable targets based on changes in domestic South African, regional and 
independent state national and external contexts and adjusted in light of the 
results of current and recent past regional tactics.
Finally, neither are the interests of different South African sub-classes and
institutions identical nor are their perceptions of the most effective ways of
SOpursuing them always congruent. Indeed, as the Ngorongoza papers
demonstrate, there can be quite antagonistic fractions within the same
institutions - in this case both the military and the diplomatic 
S1establishments.
It is therefore, worth reviewing some of the divergences and shifts in balance 
among strategic elements and tactical instruments to gain somewhat more 
insight into their underlying causes.
Interests and Perspectives; A Spectrum
White South African individual, institutional and sub-class interests and 
perceptions in respect to regional hegemony are not identical - a situation
paralleling that in respect to internal interests and perceptions.
At the individual level it is for example, quite clear from the Ngorongoza 
papers that General van der Westhuisen's intelligence service forces - who are
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hard line vorward strategy proponents and operators - viewed then Deputy 
Foreign Minister Nel (unlike Minister Pik Botha) as sharing their perceptions 
while seeing Army Chief General Jannie Geldenhuys as having different and
antagonistic perceptions. The debate within the armed forces between
advocates of the vorward strategy, a mixed approach and into laager on the
security front has been visible for over five years. While apparently 
emotionally attracted by a strike kommando/vorward stance, Prime Minister P. 
W. Botha ("Pete the Gun" by nickname) has a real concern with direct economic 
interests and a perception that Portugal's overextension on the colonial 
periphery led to collapse at the centre, both of which pull him the other way.
Institutions have interests and perceptions as institutions which are not
necessarily identical to those of the state. SATS - particularly under former
32General Manager Leubscher - is a clear example. SATS' view of "transport 
diplomacy" as a hegemonic tool and itself as a major, quasi-independent actor, 
together with its own capabilities (which do not include violent sabotage and 
destabilisation) has led it to take a fairly consistent 'co-prosperity sphere' 
approach. Loaning wagons and rolling stock, setting rates and discounts to 
get business, strengthening SAF Marine's (then a SATS subsidiary) role in 
clearing and forwarding regionally have been its tactics.
SATS needs traffic for its rail routes and especially its Eastern Cape ports
33and has limited chances of winning it domestically in South Africa. Thus 
reasonably functional internal rail services in the independent states 
funnelling into the SATS network provide SATS with both volume of operations 
and a strengthened financial position. However, SATS perceptions are not 
narrowly self interest based - regionally or at home. It sees (correctly) 
continued regional transport dependence as critical to South Africa's economic 
and regional dominance position and itself as an agent able to work for those
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ends with independent African states and institutions which could or would not
Oilreadily negotiate or work with the South African government proper.
This is not to argue that SATS approach is benign. It does see provision of 
links as giving leverage and of rolling stock as putting the stick of 
withdrawal in its hand. Its decade long programme of constructing the two 
link lines which make Swaziland a rail corridor from the Rand to the Natal 
Ports is an operation beneficial to Swaziland and increasing flexibility for 
SATS in respect to RSA's own external trade. But it is also a means of ending 
South African dependence on the use of Maputo and increasing SATS ability to 
compete against Mozambique’s transport system for Zimababwean cargo.
Divergent Capitalist Concerns
Sub-class interests also differ. The standard presentation is business vs the 
military. That, however, is an oversimplification. There are three 
conceptually, and in large measure operationally, distinguishable capitalist 
sub-classes in South Africa each with an associated professional sub-class. 
Domestically they broadly correlate with the PFP, Nationalist and 
Conservative/HNP political and political economic projects.
The first can be termed "high capitalism", the South Africa TNCs (especially 
the Anglo American - De Beers and Rembrandt groups), the large domestic 
corporate groups (e.g. Gencor, Old Mutual), some of the RSA subsidiaries or 
affiliates of TNC groups headquartered abroad (e.g. Barclays National, Shell, 
BP) and certain parastatals (notably SATS, ESCOM and SAFTO). For this 
sub-class the preservation of capitalism in South Africa (with apartheid 
dispensable if necessary for that end) and of room to expand regionally are
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the bottom line. Violence and destabilisation regionally are not unacceptable
if they are tactics to attain a ’co-prosperity sphere’ regionally or to avert
socialist revolution internally but are, in themselves, perceived as costly
and damaging to regional profit making. The high point of support for the
South African state's regional hegemony project was the Carleton House
35launching of the Constellation project.
Economically this sub-class totally dominates RSA. Politically - for historic
reasons and because its interests (or at least its perceived interests) are
distinctively different from these of most white South Africans - it is
36surprisingly weak and able at most to influence state policy at the margins.
’Middle capitalism’ comprises a greater number of firms ranging from 
moderately large corporations to efficient family enterprises. It is less 
able to perceive its capitalist viability as separable from an apartheid state 
domestically or from tight South African hegemony regionally. Exports are 
important to many firms in this group (who are SAFTO's main clients) and for 
some - e.g. the Kirsch Group which was born in Swaziland - regional links go 
deeper. While broadly in favour of a ’co-prosperity sphere’ approach, this 
sub-class is less certain of its ability to cope with truly independent 
African states or to compete with domestic or other foreign interests in them.
Politically this sub-class is Nationalist with all of the non-monolithicness 
and contradictions which characterise that party.
’Petty capitalism' can be typified by the dorp commercial establishment and 
the small capitalist or large peasant white farmer. Its direct interest in 
regional economic links is low and its perception of any broader class or 
national interest in them almost equally so. The numerically largest 
though economically weakest - of the capitalist sub-classes, 'petty
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capitalism' does not perceive itself as able to survive in any context except 
apartheid. For it P. W. Botha's 'reforms' at home look like the beginning of 
the end because they are seen as too far reaching and the desired basic aim of 
regional policy is combatting the "swaart gewar" by force and outside South 
Africa’s own borders.
Managers, professionals and - to a degree - bureaucrats divide into roughly 
parallel sub-classes. While there is no 1 to 1 employer - client -
institutional base, professional sub-class membership correlation, there is a 
perceptible one. The numerous Anglo manager links with the PFP and that 
Party's base in upper income, professional suburbs are not accidental.
Differentiation of Strategy and Tactics By Target State
As the country chapters have shown, RSA does not act in an identical way 
against all independent Southern African states. Dominant strategic elements 
and tactics do appear to differ markedly. Three contrasts can be noted as 
examples: Zambia/Zimbabwe, Botswana/Swaziland/Lesotho and - in respect to the
use of proxy forces - Angola/Mozambique.
In the case of Zambia the dominant strategic element has been 'co-prosperity
sphere' with a systematic campaign since 1965 to build up export trade and
transport linkages, an effort which has been notably successful despite
Zambia's very real effort to identify alternative sources of imports and to
■37develop intra-SADCC transport routes. An additional factor is that South 
Africa has perceived President Kenneth Kaunda not as sympathetic, but as 
committed to dialogue and therefore a potentially valuable interlocateur with 
the harder line Liberation Movements and Front Line states - but also as one
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Economic Strength And Self Interest And Destabilisation
South Africa’s economy is much more diversified, much larger and much stronger 
than that of its neighbours. It is dominated by a handful of corporate groups 
many of which have substantial external marketing and investment experience. 
Government support for business is well developed - especially in export 
promotion and finance. Because the South African home market is relatively 
small, large corporate groups, many medium sized firms and agricultural 
producers need - and perceive their need - to export and, in the first case, 
to invest abroad. For geographic and relative economic structural reasons the 
neighbouring economies are among the priority targets for exporters and 
investment.
These business interests do not in themselves create an private sector 
preference for regional economic destabilisation. Far from it - reasonably 
friendly (to foreign firms in general and RSA ones in particular) governments; 
growing economies with foreign exchange to spend; opportunities to sell, make 
profits and to remit them to South Africa are their goals. These are ill 
served by economic destabilisation and in some cases at least, e.g. Anglo
American in Angola, the firms have pursued their own interests even when these 
pretty clearly ran counter to what the South African state would have
preferred.
v"'~ \
That, however, is not the whole story. South African enterprise self 
interest is often (and has even more often been seen to be) not consistent
with economic liberation defined as reduction of external dependence and its
concentration on South Africa and structural change toward more diversified 
national and independent regional economies. Such changes would put exports,
investments and profits at ridk - especially in terms of their future growth.
\
Attempts to influence governments to accept and continue the status quo by 
South African enterprises do tend to entrench and protect economic dependence 
and therefore the economic leverage which is the foundation on which effective 
economic destabilisation can be, and has been, constructed.
The same holds true of South African export promotion via tax incentives, 
subsidies and cheap credit. The primary purpose of these instruments is not 
normally to destabilise neighbouring states but to protect and build up South 
African export markets. However, their use does hamper or even nullify 
independent state efforts to import substitute nationally, to diversify global 
import sources or to switch to greater use of regional (SADCC) import sources.
Second, enterprise concerns about export and profit safety and growth combine 
with present regional economic dominance to render destabilisation possible 
and to make it, in some contexts, useful from an enterprise point of view.
If export markets (for goods or services - e.g. transport) and/or profits are 
threatened, enterprises do want the government to support them in seeking to 
maintain and expand them. Economic destabilisation and sabotage designed to 
force economic policy changes (though not similar measures related to purely 
political objectives) can be useful in that context. However, this can be 
true only if the pressures are effective, the 'sanctioned' state does reverse 
its policy, the destabilisation is wound down and the independent state's 
economy snaps back. Permanent destabilisation directed at creating and 
perpetuating economic chaos as an end in itself (e.g. in Angola and 
Mozambique) has little attraction for the profit centred enterprise.
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who would react very negatively to sustained economic and military aggression.
This is not to overlook a persistent sub-theme of more violent action - the 
campaigns in southwestern Zambia adjacent to Namibia, the training of the 
Mashala gang, delays in goods deliveries, collusion in Rhodesian raids and the 
threatening (rather than serious) 1985 raid on the Lusaka ANC offices. These 
appear to have been designed to warn Zambia of the dangers of more active 
support for Liberation Movements, breaking off dialogue or failure to develop 
economic links without imposing such high costs as to cause either economic 
breakdown or a vehemently negative national reaction.
This approach has - at least from a South African perspective worked rather 
well. Why? First, Zambia's severe economic and technical problems flowing 
primarily from UDI and the collapse of the copper market have made her unable 
and unwilling to incur additional costs. Extended trade credit and massive
rolling stock loans are critical to Zambia. Second, South Africa has built up
a perception of itself as prosperous, a relatively fair economic dealer and a 
competent economic partner in the eyes of elements of the Zambian elite and
OO
even of the urban labour force. These perceptions have been critical to its 
trade and transport campaigns.
A somewhat harder line has been taken in respect to Zimbabwe - one constrained 
by the fact that Zimbabwe is an important export market and investment site 
but- in the opposite direction - by the reality that a prosperous Zimbabwe 
increasingly using Mozambique transport routes and taking SADCC export markets 
away from South Africa would be a major disaster for both the economic and
security aspects of the political economy of apartheid.
South Africa has apparently had difficulty in identifying ways to reconcile
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OQthese constraints. Sabotage of security installations, training of and
semi-serious support for Matabele insurgents, threatened withdrawal of trade 
preferences, interference with railway shipments and withdrawal of locomotives 
have alternated with renewed trade agreement privileges, export credit, 
provision of railway equipment and preferential freight contracts (which do, 
however, undercut Mozambique). On the whole South Africa seems to wish to 
exacerbate internal conflict (black/white and Shona/Matabele) in Zimbabwe, to 
prevent its use of Mozambican transport routes and to keep its (much more 
resilient than Zambia’s) economy off balance but to stop short of full 
destabilisation.
One aspect of South Africa’s Zambian and Zimbabwean policy is physically 
external to those states - blocking of intra-SADCC transport routes. In the 
case of Zambia this means primarily the Lobito Bay line and in that of 
Zimbabwe the Beira and Maputo links. Here too Zimbabwe's response has posed 
problems for RSA. Zimbabwe's armed forces not only defend the Beira and Tete 
corridors but act with Mozambique against RSA’s proxy, the MNR more widely and 
apparently are contemplating defending the reopening of the Limpopo Valley 
line to Maputo.
B-S-L: Variations In Tactics
South Africa's stances in respect to the three small states also vary. With 
Botswana it has been largely ’co-prosperity sphere’ use of economic dependence 
(markets in, investment in and mine workers from Botswana matter to RSA but 
also keep Botswana very dependent) backed by warnings to deter her from 
pursuing any political economy of liberation project beyond the verbal level.
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South Africa has begun to perceive this approach as increasingly unsucessful. 
Botswana has rejected advantageous Customs Union revisions linked to 
recognising bantustans, turned down water export deals even when this 
imperilled other desired RSA investments, begun to canvas non-RSA import 
sourcing and intra SADCC transport routing, been a driving force in SADCC's 
regional project. Each step has been cautious and limited but their direction 
is the same and their impact cumulative. The 1985 Gaborone Raid - and the
crescendo of threats preceeding and following it - represent (apart from 
domestic South African political payoff) a fairly desperate effort to force 
Botswana to reverse course. As there is no evidence it has succeeded in that,
RSA is presumably considering what new coercive tactics might be more
40effective and meanwhile threatening more and bigger raids.
Swaziland perceives itself as so vulnerable to RSA sabotage or economic 
destabilisation that the overt strategy has been overwhelmingly one of 
offering, but often not delivering or (as with the fertiliser, TV set and 
textile/garment industries) jerking back, incentives and the covert one 
seeking to manipulate Swati leaders. The proposed land deal illustrates the 
high point of offers and the two rail routes adding up to a Maputo Bypass 
Rand-Natal route the deliveries. The Mfansabili period seems to have been the
high point of successful manipulation and the king designate's 1985
41reassertion of his authority a potentially severe setback.
In respect to Lesotho, South Africa has not offered many incentives other than 
non-running down (or at most limited contraction) of market access for Lesotho 
labour. The bottom line of the proposed water projects is that the Rand needs 
the water (just as the converse underlies aggressive attempts to force 
Swaziland to agree to reduced flows to it from rivers rising in South Africa), 
albeit it is a carrot from a Basotho perspective. Coercion until 1986 was
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limited to raids (by RSA and its proxy, the LLA) partly based on domestic RSA 
political reaction, partly on a genuine RSA belief that ANC military 
operations were mounted from Maseru and partly to remind Lesotho of its 
vulnerability. The very limited use of economic sticks may have resulted from 
the chaos any serious use could cause. As Anton Rupert said of the Basotho 
"if they do not eat, we cannot sleep" - an enclave of 1,500,000 desperate, 
starving Basotho would not merely mean a loss of badly needed gold mine 
workers and of a large export market but also pose a real security risk.
42Lesotho January 1986: Blockades And Boomerangs
In early January 1986 South Africa blockaded Lesotho - except for contract 
mine workers whose availability to the Rand and Free State gold mines is 
critical to their full production and South Africa's shaky external balance 
and electricity. The hardship came rapidly - with less than a week's supply 
of fuel and many other key products at similar levels that was inevitable. 
Late confused calls for supplies by air may have been under consideration in 
the EEC and the UK but not visibly or urgently so. On January 19 (following 
several days of manoeuvering and skirmishes with armed ruling party youth wing 
members) the para-military forces ousted Chief Leabua Jonathan and declared a 
Military Council government. Over the next few weeks over 100 South African 
refugees named by Pretoria were moved on to Zambia. South Africa lifted the 
blockade. Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea technical assistance personnel 
were sent home. A classic succcess for the Geldenhuys memo's procedures. Or 
was it?
Lesotho was a coup (indeed a set of overlapping and conflicting coups) waiting 
to happen. Chief Jonathan - whose domestic (or regional) reputation never
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equalled his international one based on shouting from the mountain top at RSA 
which had helped him install himself by coup when he lost an election over 15 
years earlier - was in the process of changing the base of his regime by 
arming his National Party Youth Wing to form a Ton Ton McJonathan; a project 
technically assisted by the DPRK cadres.
It was Jonathan’s initiative which precipitated rethinking among Basotho 
forces determined to oust him. It may have been a desire to pre-empt them 
which caused RSA to impose the blockade when it did. After all previous 
revenge for ANC sabotage rightly or wrongly thought to relate to an 
infiltration route to Lesotho had been limited to the 1982 and 1985 terror 
raids on Maseru and various sabotage and Lesotho Liberation Army (a shadowy 
body based in the Free State with its origins in a fraction of the Congress 
Party election victors robbed by Leabua’s coup) support operations; why the 
change in 86?
What happened after the coup seems unlikely to have been South Africa's 
script. The King - Moshoeshoe II - regained full executive and legislative 
powers with the Military Council and Council of Ministers advisory to him. 
Indeed refugees named by Pretoria were sent on to Zambia (in Air Zimbabwe and 
Air Lesotho - not the prof erred RSA - planes) and the DPRK cadres were 
expelled. But other statements and actions may have been more significant:
1. the King forcefully reaffirmed that Lesotho would continue to give asylum
and would not return refugees to South Africa (and refugees continued to
arrive);
2. his cabinet was rather disparate (or broad based) but included persons
known to want more active efforts to reduce dependence on South Africa
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and none of those particularly associated with collaboration while the 
para-military seems - on His Majesty's orders - to have returned to 
barracks;
3. while agreeing to talk with RSA, the King made clear he would not sign
any Nkomati type accord;
4. Lesotho - via the King's statements, a delegation to SADCC Harare led by 
a minister known as an academic analyst of regional disengagement and a
mission to Front Line States - reaffirmed its commitment to all
(Lesotho’s emphasis) SADCC goals;
5. the coup itself was treated as ending instability and misrule - i.e. as
being purely domestic while the RSA blockade was denounced and help 
bluntly demanded for pre-planning (by Lesotho and abroad) to see that no 
rerun could be as damaging;
6. the King made no move to repudiate his late 1985 speeches at the SADCC 
Summit and the UN General Assembly which to all intents and purposes 
endorsed sanctions against RSA;
7 . the rallying symbol chosen by King Moshoeshoe - the bicentennial of his 
ancestor Moshoeshoe the Great - is one of creating and maintaining a
nation in the teeth of violent external opposition (not least from the 
Afrikaaner Republics).
Against this backdrop the King's words about "normal, peaceful and
good-neighbourly relations with all her neighbours on the bases of mutual
respect and equality... without across the border raids and economic
- 2 7 -
blockages” can hardly have sounded very placatory in Pretoria nor can one 
really suppose it was intended to be. South Africa’s relative silence about 
the new government could be interpreted as prudence (Pretorian praise 
presumably would have been a pretty poisoned gift) but also as an appalled 
realisation that the economic destablisation team had scared an own goal and 
that the king was likely to prove an opponent at least as determined as and 
potentially much more formidable than Leabua Jonathan.
Angola and Mozambique: Strategic Divergences?
In respect to its Angolan and Mozambican proxies - UNITA - and the MNR - South
African strategy has clearly diverged (quite apart from being tentative,
varying and apparently rather ill thought through in both cases). UNITA has
been seen as a potential Angolan Government (1975), a potential component in a
’coalition' (1979 to date), a means to block the Lobito Bay corridor (1975
on), a tool for broader economic destabilisation ( 1980 on), a cover for RSA
raids (notably the aborted 1985 Cabinda oil installation strike), a means to
press Angola to abandon SWAPO (1975 on). While not entirely congruent with
each other, these have led to systematic attempts to give UNITA some aura of a
political reality and project beyond RSA and to have it act as an alternative
civil government. This may be because RSA perceives Angola's location and
economic strength as making hegemony unattainable without a government
H3installed by itself.
In Mozambique the MNR has, apparently, never been seen as a potential 
government.^ No serious attempt has ever been made to provide the MNR with 
either a political programme or the appearance of a positive political base. 
The uses of the MNR were first perceived as putting presssure on Mozambique to
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accept a dependent relation with RSA and to limit its support of the ANC to 
the purely verbal. This has evolved into its use as a general destabilising 
instrument to achieve the Nkomati Pact and, with the latter’s disintegration, 
has been upgraded apparently to secure a permanent collapse of the economy and
Jl tr
of civil government in Mozambique. The abiding theme - and one reinforced 
since 1984 - has been knocking out all routes to Mozambican ports. Apparently 
RSA’s overriding goal in Mozambique is to prevent its provision of transport 
liberation for Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Zambia.^
Shifts Over Time: Evolution, Response or Random Walk?
South African regional politcal economic and ’security’ strategy has not been 
static over time. Neither has it evolved in a stable set of directions - 
other than an fluctuation but generally upward ratchet trend in the level of 
violence which, even from a South African perspective, represents failure more 
than success. The sense in which it has evolved is in response to changing 
regional and global (as well as domestic) contexts facing RSA and to South 
African perceptions as to the results of past tactics and what would work at 
any given time. The record is not one of a long term strategic package 
systematically planned and coherently implemented.
Over 1970-75 South African regional strategy centered on collaboration with
47Portugal and Rhodesia. Maintaining these economic satellites and 'security' 
buffer zones - together with the way in which their existence and relations 
with South Africa locked in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland - was apparently 
perceived as an adequate basic strategic package. Strikes against other 
states - e.g. Zambia via Rhodesia - and attempts to build up trade and/or 
dialogue with independent African states - again centering on Zambia so far as
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the region was concerned - were distinctly low key and secondary.
1976-79 represents a period of transition. The collapse of Caetano’s 
Portugal, the failure of the USA-RSA attempt to install a ’moderate1 regime in
JiO
Angola and of the settlers to hijack Mozambique and the increasingly evident 
limits to a purely military solution in Rhodesia (or for that matter Namibia) 
required strategic rethinking.
The only coherent element in this period was the relatively low key and 
tentativeness of all actions. On the Angolan front an armed truce with 
limited incursions agaisnt SWAPO and limited support to UNITA prevailed, in 
respect to Mozambique an odd mix of some penalties (or pull back of benefits 
given to Portugal such as remittances in gold at the official price not the 
market value) and continuations of some benefits (continued use of Maputo at 
moderately high levels). MNR management at this stage was Rhodesian as were 
strikes against Mozambique and Zambia. Rather more benefits (e.g. Customs 
Union concessions, investment) were targetted on Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland while Zambia was wooed on the trade and transport front. Rhodesia
was seen as key and support for Smith was melded with pressure on him to
achieve a stable white government with black faces.
The Waxing and Waning Of The Constellation
1979 saw the launching - and 1980 the demise - of the Constellation strategy 
for an over-arching ’co-prosperity sphere’ with an economic
domination/cooperation core. It failed for two reasons - SADCC, not the 
Constellation, was chosen as the politcal project of all the independent
Southern African states; Robert Mugabe and ZANU not Abel Muzorewa and the
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Puppet Show became the wave of the present in Zimbabwe which thus opted for a 
political economy of liberation not acquiescence in dependence.^ Somewhat 
separately the Angola war began to escalate under the influence of the strike 
kommando military fraction - notably General Constand Viljoen.
By late 1981 the swing to increasing use of sticks and of forward policies was
clear. Deon Geldenhuys' first consultancy report on how to destabilise
50economically for fun and profit was to hand, the Beira harbour facilities 
were sabotaged as a greeting card to SADCC (and blunt warning to Malawi) as
the first of a series of strikes now regularly held just before SADCC’s annual
51 52conference, the MNR was put back into action and UNITA resupplied and
53upgraded. J The apparent political economic aim of this much more 
aggressively hostile policy (including transport obstacle creation and trade 
threats to Zimbabwe) was to force the abandonment of at least several national 
projects of politial economic liberation ensuring the effective disintegration 
of SADCC and laying the basis for a revival of the imploded Constellation 
project.
Over 1982-85 this basically stick based forward strategy has been developed 
and pursued with one brief and ambiguous interlude. The exception was the 
early 1984 truce attempt embodied in the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique and 
Lusaka Agreements with Angola. In retrospect it appears that South Africa was 
unclear (or disagreed) where these were to lead beyond their immediate 
'security’ and image gains. Nkomati appeared to be a reversion to incentives 
- and was so read both by many opponents and by ESCOM, SATS and (more 
cautiously) Anglo-American.^ However, it was regularly and increasingly 
violated, perhaps because of a lack of internal South African agreement; 
perhaps because South Africa could neither afford achievement of the SADCC 
project of transport nor block it except by force; perhaps for mixed reasons.
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The Lusaka Agreements provided only for a disengagement over about half the 
Namibia-Angola border areas.^ They were sustainable only if a deal involving 
South African abandonment of UNITA, genuine independence for Namibia and 
arrangements to sterilize the Organge River line and limit the economic losses 
in Namibia could be agreed and in practice South Africa had neither thought 
out such a package nor was it prepared to accept the loss of actual and 
potential regional hegemony it would entail.
As a result, by mid-1985 the levels of violence carried out by South Africa 
regionally had escalated and the number of targets for strikes broadened. 
Direct economic interest damage containment had been sought - relatively 
successively - via SAFTO, trade credit and SATS equipment loans and by 
fighting tariffs which had the added virtues (from the South African 
perspective) of dislocating the trade and transport elements of the regional 
political economy of liberation and of creating conflicts of interest among 
the independent, states.
Where Next?
Late 1985 almost certainly saw RSA again re-examining its regional strategy. 
First, the mounting internal resistance was clearly not being averted by the 
vorward policy and required more ’security’ personnel available at home. 
Second, naked aggression was unifying rather more than dividing the SADCC 
members. Third, the global reaction to repression in South Africa was 
exacerbated by aggression abroad (with the notable exception of the Reagan 
Adminstration's moves toward backing UNITA).
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The threats by P. W. Botha to sanction the Southern African states if the 
world imposed sanctions on South Africa hardly constitute a full strategic 
response. Indeed they appear to have put a new momentum behind planning 
oriented to offsetting the impact of RSA focussed sanctions (begun in 1978 but 
moribund over 1980-84) by SADCC,some of the independent states individually 
and perhaps more widely. As such measures would in the main represent a speed 
up of the implementaion of the SADCC and national political economy of 
liberation projects - at higher cost but with greater priority and, probably, 
greater foreign support - the response is not one which can be welcome to 
South Africa.
Any periodisation of South African regional political economy strategy is 
approximate and open to at least marginal disagreement for three reasons. 
First, ’security’ and political economic considerations have been pursued at 
points in parallel not integrated ways. Second, variations and exceptions in 
respect to one or more states appear in most periods. Third, strategic 
reformulations have not been instantaneous either in formulation or
articulated application. Nevertheless, the foregoing periodisation does
appear to provide a broadly coherent pattern for a kaleidoscope of individual 
actions which appear much less coherent if viewed episodically.
Multiple Use Of Instruments And Multipurpose Instruments
South Africa has both used several instruments simultaneously or in sequence
to achieve goals in relation to particular countries or sectors and developed 
multi-purpose instruments suitable for furthering several strategic elements. 
The first is well illustrated by the transport sector and the second by 
Renfreight, the dominant South African and regional clearing and forwarding
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agency.
The bottom line in blocking the implementation of SADCC's transport liberation
project has always been sabotage. The financial and dependence costs of using
the SATS system have been perceived as so high that - with the exception of
Lesotho which has no land options and Swaziland which benefits from South
African transit traffic - all the regional states are too firmly committed to
57mtra-SADCC routes to the sea to be diverted by other methods. From the
1975 blockage by UNITA of the Lobito Bay corrridor (effectively never
reopened) through the 1984-85 full scale war by Mozambique and Zimbabwe
against South Africa’s MNR proxy forces to keep the Beira Corridor open,
reopen the Tite corridor and restore service on the Nacala line, much of the
58South African violence has centered on transport disruption and blockage.
However, a variety of other instruments have been used to reinforce and 
decrease the need for instant resort to sabotage. One has been withdrawal and 
provision of locomotives, rolling stock, repair facilities and 
technical/managerial personnel. In the extreme case of Swazi Railways these 
tactics - plus the two link lines - have come close to capturing the 
independent state system as a SATS subsidiary. More generally the provision 
of 6000 wagons has made continued orderly operation of several systems 
critically dependent on continued cooperation with SATS, e.g. the 3000 wagons 
in Zambia appear to constitute well over half the useable fleet of the Zambian 
system.
Disruption of supplies of petroleum products, fertiliser, food and other key 
products or of exports of, e.g. steel and beef is a means of exerting pressure 
in the transport sphere. However, it is a two edged sword as unless backed by 
blockage of intra-SADCC routes it concentrates the ’recipient's' mind on the
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need to develop alternative routes and the high overall costs of not 
disengaging from SATS.
Fighting rates - e.g cut price contracts designed to offset the advantages of 
Mozambican railand port routing - are a relatively recent development but a 
potentially potent one, especially in relation to Zimbabwe.^ Their emergence 
has been facilitated by SATS' increasingly commercial orientation (some 
probably do improve its cash flow) and by the increasing over-valuation of the 
Mozambican meticais and undervaluation of the Rand (which has fallen about two 
thirds against the US Dollar since the late 1970s and 50$ from 1984 to late 
1985). In late 1985 and early 1986 Mozambique moved to offer counter rates 
and the Rand rose from $0.35 to $0.45, both undercutting SATS' campaign.^
Indirectly trade promotion also reinforces transport dependence. Imports from 
and exports to RSA must go via SATS routes. Further, SATS de facto insists on 
relatively balanced traffic (which is in its commercial interests) so that 
Zambian imports from or via South Africa lead to effective pressure to reroute 
copper exports away from Dar es Salaam via East London and Grahamstown.
The last major instrument is a less evident one, clearing and forwarding. 
South Africa’s two major clearing and forwarding groups - Rennies (a SAF 
Marine, and thus initially SATS subsidiary) and Manica/Freight Services (an 
Anglo group company) have been merged as Renfreight controlled by Old Mutual 
(an insurance company) which has acquired SAF Marine with a significant 
minority Anglo holding and additional cross links via Barclays National. This 
company dominates not only South African clearing and forwarding but also that 
of the landlocked SADCC members and of Mozambique. Its SAF Marine links and 
its dominance of shipping agency work mean that it directly and indirectly 
dominates the South African Shipping Conferences which cover Beira and Maputo
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as well as South African ports.^
Renfreight is a multi-purpose instrument. At the simplest level it earns
profits and invisible exports - clearing and forwarding is lucrative. More
basically it is in a position to route freight via SATS (with whom SAF Marine
has strong mutual interest links even if now separately owned) because in
practice clearing, forwarding and shipping agents have wide latitude in
recommending/choosing routes for their clients. It has every reason to use
that position; associates of Renfreight - .SATS - Anglo - SAF Marine - Old
Mutual - Barclays National - profit from business routed via South Africa
(rail and port charges, insurance, ancilliary services and related goods
purchases, ship cargoes). In gross terms these gains are larger than the
clearing and forwarding fees themselves. Further Renfreight prefers to take
its profits in rand, not inconvertible regional currencies; an interest
parallel to some users' interest in smuggling profits out by purportedly
paying excessive freight - insurance charges in rand and then receiving a
ó 2hidden discount (kickback) in the Republic.
Finally, the internal commercial logic of a regional clearing and forwarding 
company means that detailed data on cargo by nature, bulk and weight, value, 
source and route must be on a computer in Johannesburg. Effectively this 
means it is available to South African intelligence for analysis (e.g. of 
sources and prices to counter with trade credits or data to SAFTO and of 
stocks and flows of key commodities) and, when desired, as a means for 
implementing selective delays and/or sabotage.
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Omniscient Omnipotence Or Wandering Tower of Babel?
South Africa’s political economy of regional hegemony is not characterised by 
omniscience, omnipotence or omnipresence any more than any other aspect of the 
total strategy. Cultivating the image that it is by claims, leaks and
disinformation peddled by supposedly ex-agents such as Gordon Winter or 
supposedly critical parties such as Godwin Matutu is a significant
sub-element or tactical instrument of the strategy, because such a belief 
demobilises - to accept the inevitable is inevitable. Both the country
chapters and the preceeding review demonstrate sharp changes in tactics
because of unforeseen events and overall results which are mixed and 
occasionally (or more often) counterproductive.
There has been a tendency to overestimate how easy it would be to "stop their 
mouths with gold", e.g. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have all refused to 
agree a package of amendments to the Customs Union Arrangements highly 
financially advantageous to them because South Africa has sought to link it to 
recognition of the bantustans as governmental parties to SACUA and, therefore, 
independent states. Similarly the positive (for RSA) effect of threats has 
been overestimated and their potential for mobilising to reduce vulnerability 
to blackmail underestimated, e.g. Zimbabwe’s basic response to threats as to 
locomotive and rolling stock supply was to refurbish and augment its own 
fleet. The level of resistance to violence has also been underestimated - 
Mozambique is fighting not capitulating and Zimbabwe’s basic answer to the 
blockage of the Beira corridor has been deploying up to 10,000 troops to 
reopen and guard it jointly with Mozambique.
How internally inconsistent or contraditory South African strategy and tactics
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are and why is not clear. South Africa's ruling circles are relatively closed 
and apparently inside information - like that of Deon Geldenhuys - probably 
contains some ad-mixture of dis-information. Pretoriology is no more 
analagous to astronomy (as opposed to astrology) than Kremlinology or 
Reaganology. However, the appearance of unclarity and inconsistency is 
frequently convincing even on re-examination, e.g. SATS', ESCOM's, Anglo's and
P. K. Botha's actions suggesting they believed Nkomati was "for real" vs
General van der Westhuisen's and Nel's contrary beliefs and actions. The
question is - why?
First, some of the objectives of the political economy of regional hegemony 
are contradictory with other elements and/or with narrowly defined 'security' 
interests. In particular export maximisation - especially to Mozambique - is 
not consistent with levels of sabotage and destabilisation adequate to cause 
reversals of commitments to SADCC's political economy of liberation or to 
avert its progressive implementation on the crucial transport front.
Similarly, strikes like the Gaborone raid are hardly consistent with deterring 
states from decreasing (still less with encouraging them to increase) economic 
links with South Africa.
Second, the divergent sub-class and different sepcialised institutional 
perceptions sketched earlier lead to inconsistencies. Anglo America, for 
example, seeks to keep the diamond mines it manages and partially owns in 
Angola functioning, whereas the overall RSA strategy of economic 
destabilisation and UNITA promotion includes shutting them down. Similarly 
Escom's primary concern vis a vis Mozambique is to restore large, dependable 
power flows from Cahora Basa because without them its peak load reserve 
capacity is near nil - below it in drought years - forcing both brownouts on
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the Rand and costly expansion programmes.^  This objective meant a distinct 
interest in Nkomati implementation to the letter and closing down the MNR at 
least in the dam area and along a corridor surrounding the transmission line 
to the Republic.
Third, while divergent interests and partially conflicting objectives are the 
common coin of national policies, South Africa seems particularly unable or 
unwilling to achieve and to enforce either a consensus or a package balancing 
different interests and objectives. It is clear that - despite the existence 
of the National Security Council - different public sector institutions and 
different fractions of the 'security' forces and Foreign Ministry have pursued 
mutually inconsistent policies in Angola and - especially in the first year
Crj
after Nkomati - in Mozambique. To explain this as a clever plot to deceive 
outsiders is too facile - at least as a complete answer. On the other hand,
the apparent degree of indiscipline by senior army officers - especially
Viljoen and Westhuisen in strike actions and Geldenhuys in publicly spelling 
out what he perceives as the fatal flaws in vorward or strike kommando
strategies - are hard to accept at face value. A further factor is apparently
lack of clear, medium term articulation of strategy and tactics to follow 
major tactical achievements, e.g. Nkomati and Lusaka (or indeed the Swazi Land 
Deal package) and of decisions on what options are acceptable under what 
conditions, e.g. the price for leaving UNITA dangling, dumping the Namibian 
puppet regime and agreeing to a 435 independence.
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Not To Be Underestimated
That South African strategy is flawed and its tactics unevenly successful - or 
on occasion counterproductive - is no reason to write it off as insignificant 
or easy to overcome. Neither is the fact that domestic resistance and
regional animosity cannot be cured by either carrots or sticks, 'co-prosperity 
spheres', strike kommando or systematic vorward policies unless and until 
apartheid is not 'reformed' but ended.
South Africa is much more powerful than the independent states of Southern 
Africa economically and militarily. It is willing to use that power to 
inflict damage and to reward acquiescence in its regional hegemony. Its 
identification of its own interests may be flawed and its post 1975 (and 
especially post 1980) strategy largely a series of ad hoc responses to 
unexpected (but not always unpredictable) external events. But its
identification of ways to inflict costs on the SADCC region has been only too
acurate and its ruthlessness in inflicting them - especially in respect to 
transport which both it and SADCC perceive as the backbone of regional
political economic hegemony - apparently virtually unlimited.
Southern Africa: The Economic Cost of South African 
Destabilisation and Aggression
Partial estimates of the cost of South African aggression have been prepared 
by Mozambique and Angola. The first comprehensive estimates - covering the 
period 1980/84 - were prepared by SADCC for the 1985 OAU Summit.^® They total 
$10,120 million. For comparison this exceeds total foreign grant and loan aid
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to the Region, k 0 % of the nine countries exports and 10/S of their Gross 
Domestic Product for the five year period. In fact the SADCC estimates appear 
to be underestimates with $12,500-13,000 million, a safer conservative figure 
and with the annual rate of economic loss by 1985 running at $4,000 a year or 
of the order of $70 per capita for a group of countries whose average annual 
output is perhaps $500 per capita. For Mozambique the costs now exceed 50% 
of GDP and for non-oil GDP in Angola the share is close to half. The 1980/85 
six year total is of the order of $16,000 - $17,000 million.
The economic costs do not stand alone. At least 250,000 human beings have 
died as a result of South African aggression. The vast majority were not 
killed in battle or even as non-combatants slaughtered to strike terror and 
raise head counts. They died because economic and military aggression has 
created famine in southern Angola and Mozambique by disrupting agricultural 
production, preventing famine relief food distribution and destroying the 
rural water, health and education networks. Of the order of 100,000 refugees 
have crossed borders - largely Angolans into Zambia and Mozambicans into 
Zimbabwe - but this figure is dwarfed by up to 5,000,000 human beings driven 
from their homes in Angola and Mozambique by the tidal waves of war and 
famine.
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The Price Of Defying Pretoria
SADCC's estimate is broken down as follows with adjusted figures in brackets:
Direct War Damage 1,610,000,000
Extra Defence Expenditure 3,060,000,000 (3,310,000,000)
Higher Transport, Engergy Costs 970,000,000
Smuggling, (Looting) 190,000,000
Refugees 660,000,000
Lost Exports, Tourism 230,000,000 (250,000,000)
Boycotts, Embargoes 260,000,000
Loss of Existing Production 800,000,000
Lost Economic Growth 2,000,000,000 (4,000,000,000)
Trading Arrangements (plus 
'Fighting' Transport Rates,
Export Credits) 340,000,000 (590,000,000)
10,120,000,000 (12,940,000,000)
The direct war damage has been calculated from overall Angolan and Mozambican 
official data and adding up major known cases as have the relief and refugee 
costs. The extra defence expenditure is estimated country by country - but 
excluding Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania for which it probably totals at
least on the order of $250 million - by comparing defence budget levels and
increases with probable spending in a more peaceful setting.
Smuggling and looting by South African and proxy forces centres on diamonds, 
ivory, timber and semi-precious stones from Angola and Mozambique while lost 
exports and tourism is calculated on the basis of Mozambican coal and sugar, 
Angolan non-oil exports, Malawian and Swati sugar and Mozmbican tourism 
unshippable (or not produced because unshippable) and not coming because of 
transport blockages. This is an underestimate as Zimbabwean steel and
agricultural exports have also been affected.
Higher transport and energy costs and lost revenues from geographically and
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financially artificial routing via South Africa have been estimated from SATS' 
revenue on regional transit traffic and higher costs on non-SATS routes (e.g. 
road via Zambia, Zimbabwe, air and road/rail via Tanzania) to Malawi. 
Boycotts and embargo costs as estimated are dominated by the loss of 
Mozambican revenue on South African cargo diverted from Maputo. Other items 
relate to disruption of supplies to and routes from the seven southern SADCC 
countries. While the latter may partially duplicate export and production 
losses, some items - e.g. Cahora Basa power sales and deterrence of Zimbabwe 
exports to RSA - are not included so that no serious net problem of 
double-counting exists.
Loss of production from existing capacity as a result of aggression and 
resulting dislocation are necessarily highly approximate. Partial official 
data for Angola and Mozambique suggest $650 million for these countries. 
SADCC estimates for Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi appear low offsetting any 
double counting with lost exports or transport revenue.
Trading arrangement costs in the SADCC paper are estimates of the additional 
annual and clearance of arrears payments which would have been made to 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland under renegotiated SACUA terms had not South 
Africa blocked implementation. The special impact of 'fighting' transport 
rates (perhaps covered in the transport cost item) and of export credits to 
block growth of intra-SADCC trade (not covered in export loss estimate as made 
by SADCC) probably add another $250,000,000.
The largest and most speculative item is loss of economic growth. In the 
absence of the costs outlined above, fixed capital formation would have been 
much higher as would the provision of productive and basic services. SADCC's 
estimate of $2,000 million over 1980-84 is based on assumed use of resources
- 4 3 -
freed - if extra military expenditure had been unnecessary and war damage had 
not taken place - on investment. Even on that basis, they appear rather low 
and adding in the other costs suggests a 1980—84 total of the order of 
$4,000,000,000 and an annual loss of $2,000,000,0000 by 1985.
These figues are highly approximate. They may include some double counting. 
However they are incomplete - especially for countries other than Angola and 
Mozambique - and relatively conservative in estimation. Therefore they
demonstrate very clearly that, whatever else it has achieved, South Africa's 
total regional strategy has immiserized its Southern African neighbours as 
well as killing 250,000 of them.
The Political Economy of Regional Liberation
SADCC is the symbol and tangible embodiment of the political economy of
Southern African liberation. It is a political economic project of the
independent states of the region - Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (with both SWAP0 and
SADCC committed to independent Namibia's accession). It is - and is so
perceived by South Africa - as a dangerous enemy of the political economy of
regional hegemony - one which has already imploded the Constellation and begun
to force the world (and some of its own member states) to pay more explicit
60attention to the clash of regional political economies and, if able to carry 
out its programmes especially in transport, a potentially mortal threat to 
sustaining political economic hegemony.
SADCC is an economic coordination organisation, not a supra-national political 
union. Its documents catalogue economic problems, programmes, projects and
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projections and their language is that of getting on with the job not 
diplomatic perorations. However, this is in a basic sense deceptive if it 
causes SADCC to be seen either as simply another economic integration grouping 
or as primarily technocratic in concept and scope. It is, of course, an 
economic coordination grouping (and more successful than any other in 
sub-Saharan Africa) and it does have technically based projects and programmes 
as the basic means of achieving its political economic goals. But ultimately 
SADCC is intensely political - not technical - economic and is about a 
perspective of development and how to achieve it; about liberation versus 
acquiscence in national economic helotry of the independent states under South 
African hegemony.
SADCC is a political economic liberation project and therefore one focussed on 
achieving strutural change and improved operation of existing institutions and 
productive capacities. SADCC is committed to collective self reliance as a 
means to liberation and structural change and therefore to constructing 
operational and equitable patterns of regional economic interaction responding 
to perceived member state common requirements and interests more effectively 
pursued jointly than separately.
While it would be oversimplification to view SADCC as the economic arm of the 
Front Line States, it would be otiose to ignore that it was created at their 
initiative and as their project or that they constitute two thirds of its 
membership and well over three quarters of its population, production and 
area. Similarly it is quite true that the SADCC aim of meeting the basic 
human needs of Southern Africans from enhanced production primarily 
coordination of the circuit of production (not simply of trade) has a validity 
quite independent of South Africa and in respect to the production 
coordination emphasis represents intellectual and institutional decolonisation
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from the neo-classical regional common market theory and the EEC model. 
However, SADCC's primary immediate objective is regional liberation from South 
African economic hegemony and its priorities - notably those in respect of 
transport, communication, agriculture and energy - are shaped by the realities 
of the present and historic South African/Southern African regional contexts.
SADCC is not a mode of production or transition to socialism project. There
is no consensus among its members on which such a project could be mounted and
to seek to do so would abort its action on the economic liberation front where
a consensus does exist. Equally, however, while SADCC operates on the basis
of consensus it is not a least common demoninator organisation. Its ruthless
statements on and condemnation of South African aggression and destabilisation
and its growing involvement in the question of sanctions against South 
71Africa and how SADCC can minimise costs and exploit potentials of such a
context clearly are less radical than those some of its members take 
nationally, but also go well beyond the purely national positions of others. 
By being coordinated, these statements and actions do have more impact than a 
collection of purely national - and disparate - ones could. Further, in the 
process of coordination (and, some would say, consciousness raising) SADCC 
members have come to see more clearly the overall nature and burden of South 
African political economic hegemony as well as the different national contexts 
which affect what actions are most critical for, and most within the ability 
to bear costs and assume risks and to mobilise resources and support of,
individual member states.
More detailed analysis of SADCC requires articulating from this broad outline 
of its political economic project to specific historical, institutional,
programmatic and operational issues as is done in the following sections. 
However, in doing so it is necessary to bear in mind what SADCC is primarily
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about to avoid wandering into an interesting exercise in applied economic 
integration and external economic relations management and conceptualisation 
which diverts attention from SADCC's central goal of reducing economic 
dependence on the Republic of South Africa.
Prelude To The Lusaka Declaration
In 1979 there was hope that Zimbabwe would soon be independent under black
majority rule; the cost of the war was becoming too high for Rhodesia, and the
attempt by the right-wing in both Britain and the USA to recognise the
internal settlement of "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" had been forestalled. But the
leaders of the Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania,
Zambia) knew that majority rule for Zimbabwe did not mean economic
independence. Seretse Khama, then President of Botswana, summarised the Front
Line leaders’ assessment: ’’...economic dependence has in many ways made our
72political independence somewhat meaningless." Therefore, acting on a
February FLS foreign ministers’ decision the Front Line finance ministers met 
in Arusha in July 1979 to discuss a new type of economic cooperation, one 
which would include independent Zimbabwe, recognising both its geographical 
and economic centrality in the region.
On April 1, 1980, a few days before Zimbabwe independence celebrations of
April 18, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was 
launched in Lusaka. The new group had been expanded in the interim to include 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi, i.e. all the independent states in the region.
The Front Line leaders were fully aware of the difficulties of the new 
venture. Their economies had suffered from the crisis of the new
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international economic system. Terms of trade for their major exports
(copper, cotton, coffee, etc) had deteriorated by 50$ in just four years,
781975-1979, and debt had risen to over 30$ of export earnings for most. They 
had no illusions that regional coordination could change that global context. 
Zambia and Mozambique had been victims of economic sabotage as their bridges, 
rail lines, and irrigation works were bombed during the Lancaster House talks, 
and the Front Line assumed that a desperate South Africa would borrow that 
tactic from Rhodesia albeit not to the extent RSA has actually used it. In 
addition, it was clear by 1980 that "autonomous" national development projects 
were not working in the Third World; particularly for low income economies. 
The Front Line economies were fragmented, dependent on primary commodities, 
and very much tied to their ex-colonial masters. Three (Botswana, Mozambique, 
Zambia) were dependent on South Africa for regular food supplies, trade and 
transport; international sanctions against Rhodesia also left the Zimbabwean 
economy more fully integrated into South Africa, for the apartheid regime 
abrogated the sanctions. However, the members also brought to SADCC 
experience of bilateral cooperation among their economies; the most innovative 
was the Tanzania-Mozambique Permanent Commission of Cooperation, which 
directly influenced some SADCC provisions (e.g. production complementarity and 
counter-trade as discussed below).
Objectives Of SADCC
Samora Machel, President of Mozambique, summarised, "...we have built an
organisation from our own realities and experience and not from patterns
74imported from abroad. This fact explains the nature of the new regional 
cooperation. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference is a 
multi-governmental, not a supra-national, organisation, set up with a life of
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its own. Decisions in SADCC are made by consensus. Implementation is 
decentralised as each project is the responsibility of one or more states. 
Projects do not proceed without the state(s) enacting it. Consequently the 
central bureaucracy has been kept small, albeit the technical personnel in the 
sectoral coordinating units and associated programme bodies are approaching 
100.
The choice of this decentralised series of consensual conferences also 
reflects the bitter experience of Tanzania in the East African Community 
(EAC), of Zambia and Malawi (before independence), in the Central African 
Federation (CAF), of centralised rule over "Portugal in Africa" and of SACUA. 
The EAC became an entity in itself, almost a fourth state in East Africa. The 
CAF drained revenue from Zambia and Malawi to expand production in Rhodesia, 
SACUA (and Portugal in Africa was) is for the benefit of South Africa 
(Portugal).
SADCC is explicitly political, not in the sense of any overall domestic
ideological congruity - that would be counterproductive even to try - but it
is political economic in declaring that economic links are not made in a
vacuum. Economic conditons and relations in Southern Africa had never been
left to "market forces". In addition to the bias of the economic unions
mentioned above, the colonial states intervened regularly to force labour
production from Africans and to limit access of their goods to markets.
Lucrative subsidies from the colonial governments went to white farmers and
mining companies, while Africans were taxed to the point of malnutrition.
75Examples abound from each state, but a few can serve as reminders. The Kyle 
Dam was built in Rhodesia to aid the sugar industry. Huletts Corporation (of 
South Africa) persuaded the government to finance construction of the dam ($4 
million), with the corporation contributing only $6 0 0,0 0 0 . ^ 6 Data from
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independent Zimbabwe shows that white commercial farmers were not on average 
particularly "efficient" with many continuing to farm solely because of the 
largesse of the state, through price subsidies, extension services, provision 
of irrigation, and other i n p u t s . A s  far as their contribution to state 
revenue, even in 1980 three in four paid no income tax."^
SADCC analysts are not fully convinced, therefore, of the "conventional 
wisdom" of 'apolitical', expert controlled "cost-benefit" analysis, for it has 
been part of a decision taking process which has been high cost and low 
benefit to Africans for centuries. "Efficiency" is a contributory but not a 
sufficient condition for economic growth and in any case can only be defined 
in relation to specified objectives. Diversity in production, sources and 
markets, and distribution of goods and services are greater priorities of 
economies trying to emerge from colonial domination. SADCC, therefore, sees 
the ultimate goal as "restructuring" the Southern African economies. The 
colonial legacy in infrastructure, production, and distribution is not 
acceptable, economically or politically. However, equally important, no 
supra-national organisation will impose any changes; restructuring will occur 
only as much as each government determines. SADCC's more modest role is to 
create a new regional economic context for national change - with new 
infrastructures, agricultural research, shared training facilities, production 
coordination and intra-regional trade expansion.
This SADCC analysis clearly complements the first state goal - to reduce 
economic dependence on South Africa. It is a practical goal, for even with a 
free South Africa, the linkages would have to be altered. However, it is also 
a political expression of repugnance for a regime and an economy which 
survives solely by repression of the majority at home and of its neighbours 
regionally. Again, SADCC is not unrealistic about the difficulty of this
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goal. First, it is to reduce, not eliminate, dependence. Second, SADCC
explicitly includes Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland whose economies are
captive of South Africa, and Malawi whose government has chosen to build
monumental projects with South African capital and technology. The economic
ability and political will to reduce dependence varies considerably; yet at
the Mbabane annual conference in February 1985, the Lesotho Minister of
Planning, E. R. Sekhonyana reaffirmed, we are "resolved to negate...
oppression as we opt for partnerships and egalitarianism in all our societies
79in Southern Africa."
Project Implementation As A Means To Economic Liberation
The objectives of SADCC to increase economic development through regional
coordination and to reduce dependence, not only but especially, on apartheid
South Africa, were not simply left to vague declarations. The steps toward
these long term goals have been many but small; determined, but practical.
SADCC now has well over 250 projects, costing about $5 billion, of which half
8oare either completed, implemented or actively under negotiation. Transport 
is considered the first priority to refurbish old lines, build new ones and 
improve training and operational coordination. Mozambique can serve five of 
the other states for ports to overseas markets, and the Southern African 
Transport and Communication Commission (SATCC), coordinated by Mozambique, has 
been praised even by the donors. Of 114 projects, 33 have funding secured 
($718 million) and 47 have funding under negotiation ($725 million). Between 
Lusaka (1984) and Mbabane (1985) meetings, five projects were completed,
r *  jt
including a micro-wave link of all the states; twelve more were started. 0
Second on the priority list is promotion of food production to reduce economic
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vulnerability; only Zimbabwe and Malawi are likely to be food exporters in the 
near future. Sixty projects have secured funding ($60 million) and another 50
Op
are under negotiaton. One indication of the type of food projects is the 
sorghum-millet-groundnut-legume research, all peasant produced, drought 
resistent, food crops. The field tests are occurring at multiple points in
O o
the nine countries with emphasis on small peasant usability.
The agriculture sector also coordinated requests for relief during the drought 
(1981-84) so that the different countries, would not be competing. ( $ 2 3  
million is known to have been secured and $ 1 1 3  million for rehabilitation to
Oh
be under negotiation). By 1986, the early warning system to detect
impending food shortages nationally and for the whole region will be in place
- the first regional system of its kind. Each member coordinates one to three 
85sectors , e.g. Botswana is in charge of agricultural research and animal
disease control while Lesotho is responsible for soil and water conservation.
The third priority of industry, coordinated by Tanzania, is to set up
production complementarity, with industry promoted in all the economies, but
planned to avoid competition. For example, each state will produce textiles,
86but textile chemicals will be produced only by Botswana and Tanzania. All 
but Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland produce cement, with SADCC potentially 
able to export cement. No new plants will be started, and studies will 
ascertain demand for additional cement products. Movement toward coordinated 
implementation of national fertiliser production plans appears to be 
progressing. In contrast, plans to coordinate tractor production seem to have
O r r
failed. Licenses to transnational corporations have been given for the same
product: Leyland has spent Kwacha 3.6 million in Zambia to make the same type
88and range of vehicle as the Zimbabwe Mutare plant. Production
complementarity can be seen as an attempt to preclude Zimbabwe’s potential
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domination as it presently accounts for 37.5% of SADCC industrial output and 
5 ^ % of SADCC heavy industry. ^ 9
Mining, directed by Zambia, is a vital sector to many of the economies, but
coordination began late and has not yet progressed very far. The mining
sector is the most fully integrated with South Africa and more particularly
with one corporate group. As one SADCC official joked, "SADCC does not have
to worry about regional coordination of mining; Anglo-American Corporation
already does it!"9  ^ Or as economist Duncan Clarke points out, "Investment
linkages thread a financial and economic pattern of regional interdependence
which is deeply rooted" - and which have survived major upheavals in the 
q iregion. To date, SADCC has not even addressed minerals marketing or mining 
legislation, but concentrated on easier decisions of inventory of resources, 
small-scale minerals studies, training and identification of diversification, 
down stream processing and production of mining possibilities.
In a real sense, SADCC will always be on the brink of failure, for its goals 
are very long term, but its projects and its new 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 perspective plan 
look only to the next five years. Development and dependence reduction 
constitute a process, and there is no "final victory". Partly due to the 
drought, the international economic crisis, and poor national planning - but 
also substantially related to South African aggression - seven of the SADCC 
economies had declines or stagnation in output/capita since 1980; real GDP of 
SADCC as a whole has fallen. Several SADCC members have reduced imports since 
1979. 92
Yet the first years of SADCC also show real successes. SADCC seems to have 
passed the first test of economic coordination in that cooperation, not 
rivalry, has increased. Member states attend meetings enthusiastically to
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argue through problems; counterparts in specific ministries know each other
personally and learn to resolve differences more easily. This intangible
benefit now has some tangible results. The Malwai road spur to the Tanzanian
Dar es Salaam road was completed in six months and a fishery sector project is
a study on potential for the coordinated exploitation of Lake Nyasa/Malawi's
marine resources. A few years back, Malawi and Tanzania had very limited
93relations and acrimonious argument over the precise boundary. In October
1984, Zimbabwe ameliorated the Malawian fuel crisis (caused by MNR attacks of
94the rail line) by shipping 3*5 million litres of petrol to Malawi. Capital
has entered the region which might not have come otherwise; certainly, aid to
Angola and Mozambique has been higher than they would have received 
95bilaterally.
Obstacles To Coordinated Development
As regional coordination moves into the second half of its first decade of 
existence, more difficult questions will arise. The coordination of SADCC has 
not threatened the political status quo of any of the states. In fact, the 
decentralised nature is designed exactly to avoid that issue. However, if the 
ultimate goal is to "restructure" economies, at some point elements of the 
ruling classes and of fairly basic national economic interests will be 
challenged.
The crisis of the international capitalist system will not go away; since the 
1970s the "upward swings" have been shallow and for short periods, To deal 
with the crisis situation, SADCC economies will have to make hard choices 
about production, not simply promote full capacity of existing industries. It 
may not make sense to rescue parts of the Tanzanian industry or to modernise
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parts of the antiquated Zimbabwe industry. As SADCC is organised now, those 
decisions will be made solely at the national level with inputs from prior 
coordination uncertain and likely to be uneven. For the region to ameliorate 
the vagaries of the international crises, however, such national decisions 
should more regularly and fully include coordinated consideration of the 
regional context. If not, SADCC will remain quite vulnerable to outside 
forces.
SADCC also has not established an investment code for the region. Until a 
uniform code is signed, international capital can play one economy against 
others, but to sign one code would mean far greater economic congruence than 
SADCC can envisage today or perhaps ever.
Foreign exchange shortages in all members except Botswana have deterred trade; 
SADCC has responded with encouragement of bilateral counter-trade. If 
Mozambique's trade is in deficit to Tanzania, it is up to Mozambique to find 
goods to export that Tanzania needs. The deficit is paid by additional trade. 
SADCC states that the foreign exchange crises will only be resolved by 
beginning with greater production and using higher trade to exchange and thus 
validate that production - the opposite of normal common market theory.
Questions which SADCC has not even addressed also affect its longevity. It has
not discussed the wage differentials among workers on various projects from
different countries. The nature of management is not discussed by Swaziland
which coordinates manpower training or by SATCC which is busy training its 
96technical unit. It appears that SADCC is accepting, without question,
hierarchical management, with the technically skilled in quite superior salary 
categories and with little worker role in decision making or at least the 
operation of various formulations and modifications of that model by its
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members. The preoccupation seems to be to find and train personnel, not to 
raise questions about social relations of production. This approach avoids 
controversy in the short term, but may undermine SADCC, as the process of 
development even at present differs greatly between economies with capitalist 
production and those which are trying to pursue a transition to socialism.
Dependence on South Africa may be reduced only at the price of greatly
increased dependence on Western capital. The Soviet Union ignores SADCC,
stating that the problems arise from colonialism and preferring bilateral
links. East Germany has begun to attend conferences; the People's Republic of
China is helping to repair the Tazara railway and a line in Botswana. The
vast majority of the funds however, are coming from Western donors. The
sectoral offices, such as SATCC and the food security office in Zimbabwe, have
only small portions of their budgets provided by the members. The Nordic
countries are the primary source of SATCC finance, and the USA, Australia,
Canada and Federal Germany are supporting the food security division. In an
interview with SATCC officials, they admit that there are no plans for the
office to be financed by members. One sugggested that technicians could be
seconded to SATCC as a contribution, but that has not yet occurred, even from
Zimbabwe which has personnel who could be valuable to SATCC who might be
spared from national requirements. The contribution to SATCC by each member
97was only $6 , 0 0 0 per year in 1984.
In addition, the local currency component of each project - at least as 
presented - remains modest. For example, in food security, 92.5$ of the 
budget is in foreign currency and for agricultural research, it is 100%.^^ In 
industry, 7 5 .5 $ of the budget will take foreign exchange to finance.^ jn 
several cases, however, domestic inputs and national contributions have 
clearly been understated or left out because the published formulation was
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designed to attract the external funds needed to complement them. Flows of 
capital to SADCC to implement these projects are a success but only for the 
short term. Plans for regional self-financing are necessary to sustain SADCC.
To date, donor interference has been limited, and SADCC has protested sharply 
and effectively when it has occurred. The USA financed the sorghum-millet 
research project at regional level and for six national components, but put in 
an exclusionary clause saying that Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania could not 
benefit. This precipitated several discussions as well as condemnation by 
President Nyerere who singled out the USA for reprimand at the July 1994 
Gaborone summit m e e t i n g . T h e  USA altered its formulation to one specifying 
what it would (as opposed to what it would not) finance, accepted that all 
findings would be available to all SADCC members and financed the regional and 
six country components, but it took another year before the other donor 
(Canada) agreed to support the three initially left out.
The British government offered £10 million to Zimbabwe in 1991, pledged the 
same funds to SADCC later and finally offered the same finance (for 
Zimbabwe-Maputo links) again to President Machel when he visited Europe in
1 9 8 3. ^  Then at Lusaka conference in 1984, the British blamed SADCC for slow 
implementation of a project, when it was in fact British bureaucratic 
procedures which caused the delay, as the UK subsequently agreed.
The Western donors will continue to offer funds to try to insert their own
agendas into SADCC. USAID prides itself in promoting small farmers, but
translates that to mean private farmers who may become "master farmers";
producer cooperatives are not on the agenda. The Nordic countries criticised
SADCC members for their agricultural policies, without mentioning the role of
1 OPinternational commodity prices in contributing to the African food crisis.
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The leaders are quite aware of outsiders' agendas. The question, which will
only be determined by the process, is whether SADCC will reject, modify or
accept the "suggestions”. To date it has acted on its stated view that all
suggestions, comments, criticisms and dialogue are welcome but that, because
SADCC and its members are responsible to their peoples, decisions must be
Southern African. The answer may be different for energy, coordinated by
Angola, than for forestry, coordinated by Malawi. The decentralised nature of
SADCC makes funding procedures complex for donors, but on occasion gives them
much room for manoeuvre. One critic of SADCC's dependence on Western capital
stated that Western strategy is no longer to divide and rule, but to "regroup
10Sand dominate; SADCC is only coordination of donors, for donors". Certainly
to date, SADCC does set its own priorities and has halted the more blatant 
attempts at interference. Further its Annual Conferences are the only regular 
multilateral consultative group meetings called, organised, documented and, 
run by the recipient side. However, plans for a greater share of national 
capital in the projects and for national experts as consultants must become 
serious before it will escape criticisms like the above.
However, to concentrate solely on overall foreign funding proportions - which 
SADCC itself has said were unsustainably and undesirably high in its 1985 OAU 
Summit paper - is to miss two critical points.
First, they are higher than envisaged in 1979/80 because the external economic 
position of SADCC's members has - largely as a result of world recession, 
drought and South African aggression - been much worse than could reasonably 
have been foreseen. To make a rapid start and to sustain a concrete action 
buildup, SADCC had to resort to increased use of external resources. While 
this does lead to a medium term problem any other choice would have led to no 
significant operational programme.
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Second, SADCC1s dependency reduction objective is not theoretical and 
undifferentiated. It is contextual and specific. Dependence on South Africa 
is the immediate enemy. Substituting dependence on - e.g. - grants and soft 
loans from a range of donors to restore and upgrade the five SADCC port 
corridor transport systems for dependence on SATS is seen by SADCC as a step 
forward. In the words of a Confueian saying adopted by Chairman Mao and used 
in several SADCC addresses and publications, "Even the longest journey begins 
with the first step". SADCC's claim is not that it has arrived but rather 
that it has taken the first step.
South Africa's Response
South Africa - after initially ignoring SADCC in the hope it would fade out - 
has clearly decided that SADCC is an enemy. At Nkomati in March 1984, Prime 
Minister Botha called it the "counter-constellation". As documented above, 
the response has been secondarily to court the weaker neighbours and primarily 
to attack the more recalcitrant. The attacks continue even though they hinder 
South African interest for markets in the region. Each SADCC Annual 
Conference from Blantyre in 1981 on, has been marked by a South African attack 
on a SADCC or SADCC related project, usually one in or affecting the host 
state.
In contrast, the PTA - as seen from Pretoria - poses no threat to South 
Africa. The preferential trade area can easily be penetrated by the South 
African transnationals, for they can maintain 49$ ownership of their 
subsidiaries and still benefit from the lower tariffs. The rules of origin 
code allows major exceptions to local origin content rules for products which
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means that Swaziland, for example, could help South African goods enter the 
104PTA via SACU. Finally, the history of pta’s shows that the stronger
sectors dominate. What may look like a surge in Zimbabwean trade could well
be South African, with Zimbabwean products largely produced by South African
subsidiaries in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean national public and private capital
might have 51$ or more of the shares, but corporations like Anglo-American
have no problem controlling production and financial decisions with limited
ownership interest if they dominate management, external marketing and also
1 ORdetermine access to technology (via licensing and patents). PTA only
requires that a "majority" of the management be nationals.
The result of years of economic sabotage from South Africa underlines the
necessity for SADCC. As the Botswanan Vice-President, Peter Mmusi stated, "It
has been said that good fences make good neighbours. We know the hard
realities of living with bad neighbours - and we will keep our fences in good 
106repair". Certainly, SADCC needs peace for the new transport links to work 
and for production to increase. Mozambique has had to "hug the hated hyena", 
as ANC leader Oliver Tambo stated and has no peace to show for it. But the
1984 Nkomati Accord did not mean the demise of SADCC. Mozambique wants to
return temporarily to the transport, tourism and power trade it had with South 
Africa in 1980, which South Africa cut off. If substantial new investment 
came via subsidiaries in South Africa, then Mozambique would have increased 
its links to apartheid, albeit the likelihood of large enterprise investments 
flows seems remote. On the other side, investment will enter on Mozambican 
terms, which are more stringent than those in Botswana, Swaziland, Malawi, 
Lesotho or Zambia. SATS and South African users are contributing $15 million 
to increase the capacity of the Maputo rail and harbour, ironically perhaps, a 
SADCC priority. One could view this as a SADCC "sell out" to South Africa, as 
necessary South African compensation for the SADCC projects it has destroyed
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or as a product of internal contradictions in South African strategy and 
tactics.
The choice by South Africa to bomb SADCC projects shows, in fact, its
vulnerability to coordinated economic links in the region. Having most
regional external trade in goods and services flow through apartheid South
Africa does not make good economic sense. The shippers praise the Beira line
when it is open; the 1984 Zimbabwe tobacco crop went through Beira quickly, at
low cost. The estimate is that Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana could save $100
107million per year on transport cost alone, if the Mozambican lines were open
and problems arising from current Rand and meticals valuation were phased out.
With appropriate government policy, growing food is cheaper than importing it
from South Africa, SADCC industry found that importing small tools costs 10
10Stimes more than if artisans made them and for many imports South African 
sources are more expensive than regional or global even with tariff 
preferences.
Economic Sanctions: Costs And Opportunities
Sanctions against South Africa as a means of inducing or coercing changes in
its internal system, its occupation of Namibia or - less frequently - its
regional aggression have been advocated more or less seriously for over twenty
years. Action, however, has been limited and concentrated on the military
equipment, knowledge and cooperation field and in sport. A parallel OPEC
based oil sanctions effort, while imposing real costs on RSA was evaded
systematically and dissolved in the buyer’s market of the early 1980s. Only
for a brief period at the end of the 1 9 7 0s did extensive economic sanctions on
109a global or near global basis appear even remotely likely.
-61-
The position changed sharply in 19 8 5. The increasingly naked violence of the 
apartheid system at home, the continued fudging of 'reform' combined with a 
growing realisation that apartheid was inherently evil and not reformable, the 
failure of attempts to negotiate South Africa out of Namibia and the rising 
tide of regional aggression - notably the strikes against Gaborone and the 
Gulf Oil installations in Cabinda interacted to fuel far greater and more 
general demands for economic sanctions against South Africa than ever before.
Actual steps began to be taken on transport, trade, finance, technical
cooperation and oil.^^ While not in themselves cripplng, they did impose
costs, create a momentum and fuel further pressures for additional sanctions.
Ironically the most effective sanctions came from investors and lenders. The
rising crisis of apartheid at home and in its regional outreach has rendered
South Africa's economy less dynamic and more foreign exchange constrained.
Further, the pressure for sanctions including pressures by advocates on
investors and lenders has introduced a "hassle factor" into continued economic
links. Increasingly TNCs have seen it to be prudent business to phase down
111and/or sell all or part of their South African interests while the world
currency and financial markets have passed a resounding vote of no confidence
with the rand falling 50% against the dollar. As a result South Africa has
been forced to declare a moratorium on external loan repayments and has
negligible prospects of securing net new loan or investment capital flows from
abroad until its domestic politcal economic situation and international image 
112alter radically.
Economic sanctions against South Africa would - because of their dependence on 
the RSA economy - impose heavy costs on its neighbours. Indeed under certain 
assumptions - including RSA tit for tat imposition of sanctions and
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intensification of strike kommando and vorward strategies - they could bring
113several SADCC state economies to collapse and Lesotho to mass starvation.
However, studies carried out at the end of the 1970s when sanctions did appear
a conceivable contingency suggested that - especially once Zimbabwe attained
independence - the costs to the region could be sharply reduced and that the
sanctionss cost reduction project would implement a substantial portion of the
11Ueconomic dependence on South Africa reduction project.
South Africa has threatened to act to ensure that economic sanctions against
it will be matched by South African economic sanctions against its neighbours
- most specifically by expelling hundreds of thousands of migrant and seasonal
workers from Lesotho, Mozambique, Botswana, Malawi and Swaziland and by
115cutting off flows of petroleum products. What it would actually do is less 
clear. Petroleum product supplies would be halted because they are based on 
imported crude oil. Exports based on RSA inputs might well not be - sanctions 
evasion requires maximising not minimising export earnings. Transit traffic 
restrictions might well be selective for the same reason plus the desire to 
create rivers of goods to and from independent African states into which to 
insert South African imports and exports. Even labour import cutbacks would 
probably be selective - neither the crippling of the gold mining sector (the 
one export which is, in practice, sanction proof) nor the creation of an 
explosive enclave of 1,500,000 desperate, starving Basotho with nothing to 
lose would seem a rational course of action. Upgrading of strike kommando 
raids, but less clearly of general vorward campaigns which cut up scarce fuel 
and military equipment on a lavish basis, would be likely.
In part the RSA reaction would depend on whether it believed damage to its 
neighbours would cause them either to become collaborators in sanctions 
evasion and/or to press the world community to relax them. Just as South
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African threats have added to the global chorus of voices saying that 
sanctions would be bad because they would injure the independent Southern 
African states (usually it must be noted voices which have shown precious
little previous concern for the welfare of these states or their people), so 
acting on them might undermine global support for sanctions once imposed.
SADCC And Sanctions
SADCC's response to the potential reality of economic sanctions against South
Africa has evolved rapidly. At the 1985 Arusha Summit seven member states -
including Lesotho - made clear their support for sanctions. Two remained
silent, but did not dissent. Claims that the seven have said otherwise in
private, on the basic question of sanctions or no sanctions, are fairly
clearly fraudulent. It was also made clear that in SADCC's view the basic
cause of violence in the Southern African region as in South Africa itself was
apartheid and that South Africa's attempts to sustain apartheid were imposing
117cripplings costs on SADCC member states and their people. 1
SADCC's own response has been to institute studies and consultations on the 
impact of sanctions against South Africa and probable South African response 
with a view to identifying concrete measures to be taken to reduce the costs
and to act in ways which will speed up the process of reducing economic
dependence on South Africa and vulnerability to South African action.
Intensified struggle and the opportunity for advancing the political economy
of liberation, not capitulation and subordinated cooperation in sanctions 
busting are - predictably - the parameters within which SADCC has chosen to 
view the sanctions question.
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Costs, Cost Reductions and Opportunities
The costs to the Southern African region of economic sanctions against the 
Republic of South Africa can be broken down into six main components: 
transport and communications, imports, exports (including labour), finance, 
security and Lesotho. Lesotho requires attention as a special case because it 
is "South Africa locked" as well as landlocked more generally so that there is 
a qualitative difference in potential costs and in possible cost containing 
measures.
118Any costing at present has to be schematic and tentative for three reasons.
First, detailed data have not been collected and analysed. Second, the 
extent and nature of the sanctions will affects costs. And, third, so will 
the nature, extent, timing and effectiveness of Southern African responses. 
The following analysis assumes sanctions covering at least petroleum, military 
and multipurpose and technology imports, a susbtantial proportion of exports 
and financial flows which are reasonably globally and tightly enforced. It 
further assumes that SADCC states will not serve as sanctions busting conduits 
but will also not sever all economic links with South Africa (and that South 
Africa will, for its own reasons, continue some links). They further assume 
that - unless deterred - South Africa will increase strike komraando raids on 
key economic targets (especially transport and energy) and continue high 
levels of support to proxy forces (UNITA, MNR, LLA, "Super-ZANU") but stop 
short of full scale, sustained invasions by its own armed forces to seize and 
hold substantial geographical areas and major cities.
Transport is for six SADCC members crucially dependent on South African 
routes. Only Tanzania and Angola would be unaffected and of the others only
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Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and - perhaps - Malawi could survive 
economically using presently functional transport routes not transiting RSA. 
In respect to petroleum transport, however, only Lesotho could not be supplied 
assuming that both the Beira and Dar es Salaam pipelines and the Dar es 
Salaam, Ndola, Maputo and Luanda refineries were functional. Similarly for 
air transport and communications the SATCC programme's partial implementation 
has already reduced use of South African facilities and links to the point 
that total severence would be inconvenient rather than crippling.
In respect to imports, South Africa is a major source for several countries 
but in every case alternative sources (quite often lower cost ones) exist, 
e.g. Zimbabwe and Malawi for grain, Zimbabwe and to a lesser degree Malawi and 
Tanzania for manufactures to cite intra regional sources only. The problems 
are twofold. First, no source is effective unless functioning transport 
routes exist. Second, in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland the pattern of 85 to 
95% of imports coming from or via South Africa has meant that there is 
virtually no commercial sector capacity to source globally, a gap compounded 
by South African (Renfreight) dominance of clearing and forwarding.
South Africa is not the primary market for the goods exports of any SADCC 
member except Lesotho. Most exports to South Africa could be redirected - 
albeit at a cost. Again the question of transport routes for exports other 
than to RSA (including redirected ones) is crucial. For labour the situation 
is different - Lesotho is totally dependent on Basotho earnings in South 
Africa while at macro level and even more for certain areas' rural household 
incomes, the dependence of Mozambique, Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi is 
significant.
Financial flows from South Africa to SADCC states are primarily of two types -
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via SACUA and export credits. SACUA flows are critical to Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland but the underlying import/excise revenues themselves depend on 
there being imports to tax, not on their sources or the fiscal structures 
used. For the heavily indebted countries with limited access to trade credit, 
a rupture in South African supply could cause a crippling seizing up of import 
flows.
Lesotho faces very particular problems. All ground transport is via South
Africa. Virtually all imports are from or via South Africa and about three
quarters of employment and foreign exchange earnings flow from migrant labour
exports to the Republic and SACUA payments. Total sanctions against Lesotho
by South Africa could, without corrective action, quite literally mean nearly
119total economic strangulation and widespread starvation.
Sanctions And Security
Security aspects of sanctions relate to the fact that to survive SADCC states 
need operative transport, communication and energy installations. South 
African strikes against existing, rehabilitated or new facilities in the 
context of sanctions could be even more devastating than its existing pattern 
of armed aggression.
The nature of the costs in effect outlines the countermeasures required. 
Especially in the short run, these could not eliminate all costs but could 
contain them and, indeed, begin to provide positive benefits fairly rapidly. 
Because the cost of sanctions would bite almost immediately and 
countermeasures take time to yield results, the case for prior planning and - 
to the extent feasible - execution is very strong.
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The transport requirement is simple, if difficult. Except for Lesotho, it 
consists in reopening, rehabilitating and protecting the Nacala, Beira and 
Maputo (via Limpopo Valley Line) corridors with rehabilitating and protecting 
the Luanda Corridor highly desirable but not essential. In effect it is to 
reverse the effects of South Africa's sustained 1981-1985 campaign against 
SADCC transport routes by carrying out the balance of the priority projects in 
the SATCC Programme on a selective and accelerated basis.
The problems beyond that are logistical and manageable - e.g. routing of 
Botswana traffic, developing onward transit facilities for petroleum products 
from Mutare and Ndola, coordinating traffic flow and route capacity 
allocations, adding to rolling stock, locomotive and lorry fleets. While SATS 
might well seek immediate recall of its equipment, presumably in the context 
of sanctions return would be denied or phased to allow arrival of replacement 
units.
Trade problems - apart from labour - turn on transport and commercial 
institutions. Alternative sources exist. The basic problem is getting the 
goods to and from the landlocked states. In the special case of electricity 
the basic requirement is three high tension lines - Cahora Basa to Maputo; 
Maputo (or the Cahora Basa-Maputo line) to the Swaziland grid; connecting the 
Zimbabwe and Botswana grids with a high capacity link.
However, to use external sources and markets, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho 
each needs an independent import/export house with global information sources 
and contacts. The practicable way of creating them rapidly would be joint 
ventures of the respective development corporations either with northern 
trading houses (including major international trade co-ops such as the
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Scandinavian Wholesale Cooperative Federation) or with existing Zimbabwean 
external trade houses. Similarly in respect to clearing and forwarding joint 
ventures with non-Renfreight firms with external contacts are needed along the 
lines of Mozambique’s joint venture with Agence Maritime Internationale (AMI 
of Belgium). These steps are desirable and would pay even in narrow financial 
cost terms sanctions or no sanctions.
Employment, Revenue And Airlift Costs
Reducing the costs of loss of jobs in South Africa requires forward planning 
of alternative employment - especially for and in rural areas. Numerous 
afforestation, irrigation, anti-erosion, water supply, school and clinic plus 
associated staff houses, improved track and feeder road, local warehouse and 
community centre projects can be designed for execution largely by unskilled 
and semi-skilled labour. The problems are in identifying large programmes and 
their design, skilled personnel, tools and materials requirements and in 
mobilising these (and the finance to procure and deploy them).
In respect to finance the ’loss' of SACUA can be fully offset by fairly 
moderate upgrading of existing national customs and excise services to 
undertake collection parallel to instituting national import and excise 
tariffs - if import flows are maintained. Alternative trade finance sources - 
e.g. from non-commercial sources - would need to be mobilised to substitute 
for South African.
Because transition to new transport and trade patterns could neither be 
instantaneous nor problem free, reserve stocks of key goods - fuel, food, 
fertiliser and tools, inputs into manufacturing, spare parts (especially for
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the transport sector) - need to be built up, preferably to 90 to 12 0 day
levels in the landlocked Southern African states. Given the present 
uncertainties in delivery dates and South African engineering of shortages to 
exert pressure, such reserves are desirable sanctions or no sanctions.
Lesotho's survival will require international support including an airlift
capable of carrying 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 to 500,000 tonnes a year (15 to 50 large cargo 
planes shuttling from Maputo to the new Maseru international airport) 
depending on whether only petroleum products or all imports have to be moved. 
There is nothing physically impossible about this - the Tanzania/Zambia 
airlift after UDI was technically much more difficult - the problem is one of 
cost. Similarly to provide income for 50,000 to 200,000 Basotho workers 
expelled from the Republic and to sustain the foreign exchange for imports
(and therefore tax revenue) flows of the Kingdom will require a major external
financial support programme.
Security issues extend well beyond the scope of this chapter. However, the 
recent past makes two points clear. First, RSA sabotage can render many 
projects key to the political economy of liberation unimplementable or 
non-operational. Second, national and coordinated (as on the Beira and Tete 
Corridors) Southern African security operations can limit the damage done by 
South African aggression.
The implications of this are that without improved security all cost reduction 
and opportunity exploitation measures and projects - especially in transport 
and energy - will be vulnerable to South African military strikes and that 
broader regional defence coordination could substantially reduce the damage 
such strikes could achieve as well as increasing their costs in fuel, 
personnel and equipment to South Africa. Further, it is likely that the
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interposition of a multinational (e.g. Commonwealth) or northern (e.g. Nordic) 
blocking force with real damage infliction capacity (especially first line 
combat aircraft) would deter South Africa from carrying out a high profile 
strike programme at all.
Cost Reduction: Some Prerequisites And Considerations 
The key requirements for effective cost reduction are:
a. coordinated data collection, analysis and planning by SADCC member 
states;
b. identification of key programmes and measures and of input requirements 
for carrying them out;
c. initial national, SADCC and international mobilisation of resources to 
begin implementation now; and
d. pre-sanctions contingency planning and securing of resource commitments 
to allow the balance of the programme to be instituted promptly in the 
event of sanctions.
While it would be dangerously romantic to assume that, even if these steps are 
taken successfully, sanctions against South Africa would not impose severe 
costs on Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Zambia, they could reduce 
them to bearable levels. Furthermore, almost all of the sanctions cost 
reduction measures are in fact part of the political economy of Southern 
African regional liberation and once completed would provide substantial 
gains.
Finally, with the present annual cost of RSA aggression and economic 
destabilisation already running at $4,000,000,000 a year and rising with no
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end in sight it is otiose to talk of the costs of sanctions to Southern Africa 
except in the context of the overall struggle between the inherently and 
antagonistically contradictory South African political economy of hegemony and 
the SADCC political economy of liberation. Sanctions would mark another stage 
in that struggle and, to the extent they succeeded, would futher the welfare 
of the states and peoples committed to the political economy of regional 
liberation.
Notes
Reg Green is a member of SADCC's Liaison Committee and an advisor to 
SADCC as well as to several of its member States. However, this chapter 
represents his own analysis and judgement and does not necessarily 
reflect the position of SADCC or any of its members nor is it based on 
confidential SADCC or member state materials.
See Chapter ? on South African economy, pp_______.
[Assuming we get it revised!]
AIM, March 16, 1984
Best shown in three studies by South Africa's would be Henry Kissinger, 
Deon Geldenhuys. The first "Some Strategic Implications of Regional 
Economic Relations for the Republic of South Africa", ISSUP Review, 
January 19 81. Institute of Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, 
January 1981 was in fact a government study which played a seminal role 
in the evolution of economic destabilisation and selective sabotage 
tactics even though Geldenhuys has chosen to deny it and pose as a pure 
academician. [Diana - cite your interview here.] The second 
"Destabilisation Controversy in Southern Africa", South African Forum, 
Position Paper, September 1982 is a clever, high level, sales job for the 
destabilisation tactics he had earlier propounded. The third, The 
Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, Macmillan, 
Johannesburg, 1984 is an extremely thorough study of all aspects of South 
African foreign affairs based on privileged access. It could be 
described as authoritative were Geldenhuys the detatched observer he 
claims to be and not an active participant - unadmitted - in some of the
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issues he analyses and events he describes.
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6 . See E. L. McFarland, "Benefits to the RSA of Her Exports to the BLS 
Countries" in Botswanafs Economy Since Independence, M. A. Oommen (ed), 
Tata-McGraw-Hill, New Delhi, 1983-
7. See Chapter ___ on South African Economy. See also M. Fransman, The
South African Manufacturing Sector And Economic Sanctions, No. 11, 
"Economic Sanctions against South Africa", International University 
Exchange Fund, Geneva, 1980.
8 . See "Economic sanctions against South Africa" series especially No. 5 (M. 
Bailey, Oil), No. 10 (R. Riddell, Agriculture), No. 11 (op cit), No. 12 
(R. Murray, Mining).
9. Southern Africa; Toward Economic Liberation, SADCC, London/Gaborone, 
1980.
10. See Geldenhuys, Diplomacy of Isolation, pp 121-166 for a detailed 
exposition including transport, energy, agriculture, mining and private 
enterprise. The role of railways as built up by former General Manager 
J. G. H. Loubser has been especially critical. See Geldenhuys, pp 
153-55; Loubser, "The function of transport as a line of communication 
between states in Southern Africa", 1980 Speech, South African Railways
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University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1982.
11. See annual SADCC (SATCC) Transport and Communications sectoral papers to 
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See also A. Nsekela (editor) for SADCC, Southern Africa: Towards Economic 
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13» e.g. Geldenhuys, op cit; Leubscher, op cit.
14. Geldenhuys, 1981, op cit, Note 4.
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in the form of a sabotage raid against a SADCC project or - in 1986 - a 
retort against SADCC's pro sanctions position through the blockade of 
Lesotho. Geldenhuys, in The Diplomacy of Isolation, passim, clearly 
shows that RSA's perceived regional interests (including transport) are 
much more threatened by a body committed to economic liberation and which 
aborted the Constellation than by a trade promotion body.
16. See ACR 1979-80 op cit and Geldenhuys, Diplomacy of Isolation, op cit,
esp. pp 1 0 7 - 1 5 8  and sources cited for detailed discussion. Geldenhuys
clearly views full blown Constellation proposals as always having been 
overambitious and deprecates the 'communist bogey' thinking as inaccurate
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Heineman, London, 19 81. But c.f. sources at Notes 6 , 21 as at the time 
Hudson still believed membership to benefit Botswana.
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December 1985, publication pending.
1 9 . ibid.
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rand cuts will be needed to preserve the undercutting.
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African Customs Union meeting ("Estimate of Duty Content of Botswana's 
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Houhlo, "The Direct Duty Content of Lesotho's Imports", Ford Research 
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revenue would still allow lower user prices.
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